The Houthi threat is like a dog without fangs

Al-Houthi detonated the first Iranian Revolutionary Guard bullet in his name in Saada exactly more than twenty years ago, without any social, economic, or even military unrest in Saada at that time preceding it, except that he was able to detonate it and had full preparation for that war. Between 2004, the date of the first Houthi war, and April 2022, the date of the truce that continues until today, Al-Houthi launched hundreds of battles and attacked most of the Yemeni governorates, brutally using all his power, just as Zionism does in Gaza, and just as Zionism represents the colonial West, Al-Houthi represents the Iranian occupation.

For more than a year, the Houthi threats to return to war again and attack the Yemeni governorates liberated from it, and the threat recently reached a clear threat a few days ago to Saudi Arabia, including explicitly threatening to close Saudi banks, airports and ports, after a series of decisions taken by the Yemeni government through the Central Bank working to empower its institutions. The financial and economic sector is able to control the Yemeni market, and reset it in accordance with Yemeni law.

Between the Houthi bombings of wars, his attacks and occupation of Yemeni cities, governorates and countryside, and his current threats, there is a gap that the Houthi does not acknowledge, or is unable to see, which is his clear inability to return to war, in application of the saying: A barking dog does not bite. The proverb does not apply to Al-Houthi completely, as he may launch an attack in one form or another in his last attempt to draw the attention of Saudi Arabia to push progress in negotiations with him a step forward, but those attacks, which are likely to be on the sea lane, and on Saudi ships, will not be able to Influencing many opinions.

Al-Houthi himself admitted in his last speech that he has been avoiding returning to war until now so that there will be no problem, which was something that had never occurred to him before. Rather, the devastating results of the war were being exploited by Al-Houthi to his advantage, which is different now. Therefore, Al-Houthi came back and admitted that the option of returning to war was a suicidal option: “Let a thousand thousand problems occur.”

But Al-Houthi forgets several local, regional and international variables that are no longer in his control as they were before: at the local level, union strikes and tribal, professional, and popular demonstrations have become a widespread reality that undermines the Houthi’s ability, and the increase in individual resistance against the Houthis is constantly on the rise, the latest of which was in Hodeidah two days ago, and military defections in The ranks of the Houthis and the financial drain on their capabilities have increased in recent months. The Houthi naval attacks, claiming to support Gaza, only led to a change in the popular mood, which was dissatisfied with the Houthis. They did not gain any legitimacy, and they did not lead to a change in the regional position on the Houthis, despite the development of his attacks into joint attacks that he claimed with the militias affiliated with Iran in Iraq. Also, the Saudi-Iranian agreement has so far been in effect since March 2023, despite its ambiguity and the ambiguity of the Yemeni file in it, but Al-Houthi most likely cannot bypass that agreement.

Internationally, Al-Houthi has lost the prestige and influence that he used to exploit and employ through the United States and the United Nations to pressure Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government to implement his demands. Today, he is devoid of any influence. Al-Houthi seemed crazy, to the point of obsession, in his last speech, with a series of government decisions, especially related to banks, and to cover up his scandalous inability. Al-Houthi went on to threaten Saudi Arabia, even though he issued a series of decisions in response to the decisions of the Central Bank in Aden, but they are worthless so far.

In conclusion, Al-Houthi has become more incapable of attacking, despite his possession of a larger series of Iranian missiles of various types, unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned boats as well, but they are no longer sufficient to enable him to achieve his goals as it was before.