Biden's positive stance and its impact on Saudi Arabia's regional behavior and the Yemen war

There are few hopeful incidents in my country, Yemen, which suffers from complete paralysis, loss of will and sovereignty, the entrenchment of a tragic reality, the absolute dominance of external interveners, and the disastrous failure to restore peace through politics or war, while Washington’s position towards the most influential regional capitals in the Yemeni scene continues to play a fundamental role in the transformations of the Yemeni scene and perpetuates the humiliating dependence on the legitimate authority and the elite that works under its umbrella at home and abroad.

Recently, information has emerged about what is believed to be a long-overdue positive shift in the ideological position of the administration of Democratic US President Joe Biden, towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as this president prepares to leave the White House permanently on January 20 of next year, in favor of a new president.

This information indicates that President Biden’s veto on the export of offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia has been lifted since he arrived at the White House in early 2021, coupled with a clear desire to end the war in Yemen without a clear desire to arrange a safe and honorable withdrawal for one of Washington’s most important and oldest allies in the Middle East.

But this shift is not considered decisive and cannot be considered an American permission to re-launch Saudi Arabia’s hand in the Yemeni scene. The Saudi military intervention, despite the cessation of the war, still faces real mines that Washington contributes to creating and planting, and which are represented in the free hands of other regional players who do not seem to be in tactical or strategic agreement with Saudi Arabia and its traditional influence in Yemen. The reference here is specifically directed towards the Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman.

There are strategic areas in Yemen that are still opaque to Saudi Arabia, where its security, military, and even political and social influence is low, including, for example, the western coast of Taiz Governorate, where Bab al-Mandab and the port of Mokha are located, and to a lesser extent, the Socotra Archipelago Governorate bordering the Indian Ocean, where the absolute Emirati influence supported by Washington is evident in these two areas, and where the forces built and supported by the Emirates are granted influence that is deducted from the supposed sovereignty of the legitimate authority over its lands.

President Biden’s hostile stance towards Saudi Arabia and its new young leadership represented by Crown Prince and Prime Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and before that the disappointing behavior of former President Donald Trump, following the worst attack on the huge oil facilities in the east of the Kingdom, had a negative impact on the military performance of the leader of the Arab coalition in Yemen, and she felt greatly let down by an old ally and a long-standing strategic partner.

These two positions pushed it to manage its military intervention with the logic of compromising concessions, and to direct its material and military support, not in order to strengthen its supposed allies in the Yemeni arena, but in order to contain them, weaken them, and gradually remove them from the equation of the conflict originally built on the principle of restoring the state and defeating the coup plotters, and to shift towards rewarding and empowering the Houthi coup plotters.

On the other hand, we see the late positive variable on the part of Washington and the American president towards Saudi Arabia; pushing it to monopolize the arrangement of the field and political situation in Yemen, which has been viewed throughout the past decades as Riyadh’s backyard, a description made possible by the political elite, which the Kingdom played a fundamental role in establishing at the head of government in Sana’a.

There are indications of political tension between Riyadh and some regional capitals, driven by the Kingdom’s desire to exploit the Biden administration’s position to narrow the margins granted to other regional players and end the appeasement arrangements with them, as they had shown throughout the past period a degree of independence in practicing influential roles in the Yemeni arena, some of which were clearly calculated in favor of the Houthi group and other less important players.

The mistakes of the Yemeni elite at home and in the capitals are being perpetuated, with their continued vulnerability to the influence of external players and their influence in appointing members of this elite to political, military and security roles, and narrowing their space for movement inside Yemen and in the capitals of the world. Such behavior unfortunately deprives Yemen of the opportunity to get rid of the influence of external powers, and to forge a path of struggle that relies on the absolute will of the Yemeni people, and enjoys a sufficient degree of independence and alignment with national priorities.

The disappointing behavior of the Yemeni elites contributes to curbing the hope that is kindled by the honorable sacrifices of the sons of the "Qayfah" tribe, which is currently engaged in the latest confrontations with the armed elements of the Houthi coup group, in the village of "Hama Sarar" affiliated with the "Wald Rabi" directorate in Al Bayda Governorate.

This field development, which is being made by brave Yemenis, needs support today. Nothing can restore the bad reputation of the legitimate authority and the Yemeni elite that operates under its umbrella, both domestically and abroad, more than showing courageous positions and field support for the people of Qayfa, and apologizing for the betrayal that this tribe has suffered since its early confrontations with the Houthi group in 2014, which were carried out with American air support for the Houthi militia, in addition to the confrontations that the Hajur tribes fought in Hajjah Governorate five years ago and were met with betrayal by those who control the decision of legitimacy from the Yemeni leaders and their supporters.

(Arabic 21)