Why did Israel choose to bomb the oil facilities in the port of Hodeidah... and what should the international community do to prevent the destruction of the infrastructure? (analysis)

An American institute said that the humanitarian consequences of the Israeli attack on the Yemeni port are real, but they should not be overestimated, especially since the real ones responsible for the ongoing fuel shortage and the risk of famine in Yemen are Iran and the Houthis.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy published an analysis by researcher Michael Knights, who specializes in military and security affairs for Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Gulf states, stressing the need to prevent Israel from destroying more infrastructure in the port of Hodeidah , western Yemen.

On July 20, Israel responded to a deadly Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv with massive airstrikes on the Yemeni port of Hodeidah, destroying most of the oil storage tanks at the site.

On the one hand, this targeting choice reflects critical gaps in the international community's policy toward the group: specifically, the failure to implement UN sanctions on the Houthis or enforce US sanctions aimed at preventing Iran from providing petroleum products as a valuable form of terrorist financing. On the other hand, Hodeidah is also an essential entry point for humanitarian aid, so targeting its infrastructure has negative repercussions for the Yemeni people.

To address this dilemma, Israel must be persuaded not to respond to ongoing attacks by destroying further infrastructure in Hodeidah port, which the 2018 Stockholm Agreement left in the hands of the Houthis on the assumption that they would demilitarize it. But this will in turn require the international community to do better to ensure that humanitarian infrastructure is not used for the benefit of a designated terrorist group.

Indeed, the United States should remind global partners in the Security Council and other forums that Houthi diversion of aid, corruption, and kidnapping of aid workers are now the primary drivers of humanitarian risks in Yemen.

What did Israel target?

Although the Houthis have carried out more than 220 attacks on Israel since the Gaza war broke out last October, the Hodeidah operation was the first Israeli counterstrike in Yemen to be acknowledged. The target area contained approximately twenty-eight oil tanks and satellite images showed that as many as eighteen were clearly destroyed, smoke obscuring perhaps other damaged tanks as well.

It also appears that Israeli forces deliberately struck two gantry cranes at the container port, using precise double strikes on their engine compartments (see below for more on these cranes).

There is no doubt that Israel chose these targets because imported hydrocarbon products have become Iran's primary means of financing its Houthi partners, just as it has illicitly funded other bad actors such as the Syrian regime and Lebanese Hezbollah.

Hence, Tehran's hand is clearly visible in the movements and ownership of many of the tankers that bring these products to the ports of Hodeidah, Saleef, and Ras Issa, which are controlled by the Houthis. The United Nations Group of Experts on Yemen has been highlighting this problem since 2019, when it estimated that Iran provides $30 million per month to support the Houthi war effort.

The Houthi movement has also facilitated the sale of sanctioned Iranian petroleum products outside Yemen. In 2021, the US government began imposing sanctions on the network of Iran-based Houthi financier Saeed al-Jamal for smuggling “Iranian fuel, petroleum products, and other goods to customers throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.” According to the Treasury Department, “a significant portion of the revenues generated from these sales are routed through a complex international network of brokers and exchange offices to the Houthis.”

Related sanctions continued to be imposed during this year, most recently on February 27 and July 18, when front companies and other entities linked to the Houthis and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force were designated for their involvement in oil smuggling activities.

Even a quick search of ships visiting Hodeidah and Ras Issa shows that Tehran has no interest in hiding its terrorist financing efforts. In just one week's sample period studied by the author in March (the last month for which UN records are available), at least four of the fourteen ships delivering hydrocarbon products to these ports had a clear connection to sanctioned Iranian entities (or Sanctions will be imposed soon):

• A diesel tanker was prominently mentioned in a massive leak of Sahara Thunder emails for smuggling Iranian fuel oil from Bandar Abbas, and is likely to be sanctioned in the coming months.

• Two huge shipments of liquefied petroleum gas (commonly used for cooking) were transported on ships linked to management companies subject to US sanctions.

• Another ship carrying fuel oil was operated by a company with a history of so-called “dark frequencies” to Iran (i.e. with transponders turned off illegally) and ship-to-ship transfers with ships subject to US sanctions.

In total, the suspicious vessels identified during this sample study period were carrying 102,854 metric tons of hydrocarbon products (equivalent to 869,107 barrels of oil) with an estimated domestic value of just over $8 million, specifically, $6.4 million of diesel, $1 million in liquefied petroleum gas and $650,000 in fuel oil.

Based on images of the Israeli attack, it can be concluded that only eight of the oil tanks in Hodeidah were full at the time (eight of which appeared to be burning, and although a larger number exploded, they were probably filled with combustible vapor rather than petroleum products). In this case, the Houthis may have lost up to $60 million worth of products.

It is noteworthy that none of the ships in this sample study period were flagged for inspection by the Djibouti-based UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism, which effectively expired this spring due to staffing shortages (including the diversion of some inspectors to efforts humanity in Gaza).

On March 14, around the same time that the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism halted its public reporting, the UK’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, James Kariuki, told the Security Council of “deeply worrying” reports of “Iranian vessels circumventing inspections.” The United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism" and its anchorage in ports controlled by the Houthis.

In May, UK Permanent Representative Barbara Woodward warned of a “significant increase” in Iranian cases of circumvention of the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism, with an estimated 500 trucks loaded with uninspected materials entering Hodeidah since October.

On July 9, US Ambassador Stephanie Sullivan called for strengthening the capacity of the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism to inspect a wide range of ships heading to Yemen.

Humanitarian repercussions

Hodeidah remains an essential entry point for food, handling nearly double the operations of Ras Issa and Saleef combined, including all containerized food and medicines sent to Houthi ports. But the Israeli strike should not affect this unloading capacity, despite the loss of two gantry cranes.

These two cranes were already inoperable before the raid. Since 2015, all container unloading operations in Hodeidah have been carried out by ships with their own cranes on board (four mobile cranes provided by Saudi Arabia in 2018 were intended for unloading bulk cargo, not containers). It is also still possible to bring in non-containerized food items via the other four shipping docks in Hodeidah and via Saleef.

More importantly, the port of Hodeidah had been operating well below its unloading capacity long before the Gaza war and the Houthi solidarity attack campaign, mainly because many shipping companies did not want to be exposed to the slow, dangerous, and corrupt environment in Houthi-controlled ports. Therefore, an Israeli strike alone will not push the humanitarian situation towards famine, although the Houthis will make it appear that way.

Fuel outages are likely to be more severe, with potential unintended humanitarian consequences (such as the inability to operate power generators and water pumps). These consequences would be worse if the Houthis prioritize their regime's and military needs over the needs of civilians, as they usually do. Fuel prices in Yemen are already rising, but this is likely to benefit the Houthis to some extent since they control the market.

Fuel can still be imported via undamaged docks in Hodeidah, but almost all of the port's operating oil storage has been destroyed, and local pipelines may have been damaged as well. Fuel import capacity was not affected at Ras Issa, which handles all LPG shipments and some gasoline and diesel.

Implications for US policy

The Houthis and the international humanitarian community will almost certainly focus their attention on Israel's controversial targeting options. Washington, for its part, privately condemned Saudi strikes on Hodeidah in 2015 and strongly urged the United Arab Emirates to exercise restraint as fighting approached the port in 2018, but it is unclear whether American officials have tried to influence Israel’s calculations in End of this week.

In any case, the US government should not allow the Houthis to portray themselves as victims in their rhetoric. This means setting the record straight through the Security Council, and reminding the international community that the Houthis are still the aggressors in Yemen and the Red Sea region in general.

In addition, the Houthis could still import similar levels of food and fuel through various means, and could obtain even more if they stopped interfering with Yemeni government-controlled ports and land delivery into Houthi territory.

US policymakers should ask Israel not to further damage infrastructure given the extremely fragile humanitarian situation in Yemen. But the best way to rein in Israel is to significantly limit Iran's exploitation of the ports. Iranian fuel shipments are delivered to the Houthis using fairly clear shipping channels that the United States can easily distinguish.

These efforts should be disrupted by the enhanced inspection efforts envisaged by US and British representatives to the United Nations and authorized maritime quarantine authorities. This will not deprive Houthi-occupied Yemen of fuel, since most fuel shipments remain commercial shipments, nor will it completely eliminate the Houthis' ability to benefit from the fuel market.

But it would remove some incentives for Israel to hit fuel targets. More effective international inspection efforts may also revive the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism, further reducing Houthi access not only to Iranian oil, but also to Iranian anti-ship and long-range strike systems.