Power and Camouflage.. An investigative report reveals the structure, roles and practices of the Houthi militia’s security and intelligence apparatus

An investigative report revealed important details about the security and intelligence apparatus established by the Houthi militia as a means of strengthening its authority and asserting its control over the areas it controls, after it carried out numerous information gathering and survey operations to identify its loyalists and opponents.

The report, prepared by Yemeni academic Dr. Abdul Qader Al-Kharraz, shed light on the structure, roles and practices of this security apparatus, the strategy used by the Houthi militias and the threats they pose to local, regional and international security.

It also highlights the names and roles of some individuals within the Houthi security and intelligence apparatus, providing insight into their backgrounds, relationships, and operational activities. Each section also addresses how these individuals contribute to the militia’s overall strategy, as well as the implications of their actions for the security landscape in Yemen and beyond, and the issues of forced abductions, torture, and murder.

He noted that the Houthi militia often rotates personnel in key positions to maintain operational security and camouflage, noting that this practice is necessary to prevent exposure of its strategies and reduce the risk of infiltration or intelligence gathering by rival factions or external entities.

By regularly changing the roles of key individuals, the militia creates an impression of stability and authority while ensuring that sensitive information remains protected, as well as camouflage to ensure that individuals or their transnational companies engaged in illicit activities such as arms smuggling and recruitment into international wars cannot be traced, the report said.

Report text:

Overview of the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service

The Houthi militia established its Security and Intelligence Service in 2016 in response to the escalating conflict and the need for a cohesive security apparatus. This initiative represented an important step in the militia’s efforts to consolidate its authority and assert control over the territories it occupies in Yemen. This represents an important step in its efforts to consolidate its authority and enhance its operational capabilities. This apparatus was created in response to the increasingly complex and volatile political landscape in Yemen.

Primary operations and structure

Initially, the security and intelligence apparatus operated under a veil of secrecy. The militia issued decisions through a so-called Revolutionary Committee, which was formed to centralize power and streamline decision-making processes. This approach allowed the Houthi leadership to maintain tight control over intelligence operations while minimizing the risk of exposure to external and internal adversaries.

The Houthi security and intelligence apparatus is a crucial element in the militia’s strategy to consolidate control and overcome the challenges posed by a multifaceted conflict. Through a combination of secrecy, personnel rotation, and strategic alliances, the militia aims to enhance its operational capabilities while managing perceptions both domestically and internationally.

Understanding the dynamics within this apparatus, particularly the roles of key figures and the creation of militia-affiliated companies abroad through individuals affiliated with the militia and the security apparatus and their connections to centers or councils established internally such as the Supreme Council for Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA) or the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center ( HOCC ) as well as their connections to organizations such as the Arab Organization for Human Rights ( ARWA ) or Insan, is essential to understanding the broader implications of the Houthi militia’s actions in Yemen and beyond.

Unification of security services

Intelligence gathering: Using both human intelligence and signals intelligence, the device gathers information about potential threats, including monitoring communications and conducting surveillance on individuals and groups.

The structural and operational analysis of the Houthi security and intelligence apparatus demonstrates a sophisticated and strategic approach to governance and security. By unifying the various security apparatuses and empowering key individuals within their ranks, the militia is consolidating its control over the territories it occupies.

Understanding the dynamics within this service, including the roles of key figures and their operational methods, is essential to understanding the broader implications of the Houthi militia’s actions in Yemen and the surrounding region.

Organizational structure of the Houthi security and intelligence apparatus

The Houthi security and intelligence apparatus is organized in a hierarchical structure that allows for the efficient management and coordination of various security operations. This structure aims to facilitate both internal and external intelligence activities, and to ensure that the militia is able to respond effectively to threats and maintain control over the territories it occupies.

Through the documents we obtained, we tried to develop a vision for the main organizational structure of the apparatus, whether at the level of leadership, agents, and advisors (Document 1), in addition to developing a vision for the departments, administrations (Document 2) and branches affiliated with the apparatus. The following is an overview of the main sections within this organizational framework.

Main components of the structure

Leadership Team:

At the top of the hierarchy is a leadership team consisting of senior officials responsible for overall strategic decisions. It includes the head of the agency, his deputy, agents and consultants, and this team typically includes individuals with strong loyalties and connections to the movement’s leader, as well as military backgrounds and experience in intelligence operations.

Operational departments:

The Security and Intelligence Service is divided into several operational departments, each of which is charged with specific responsibilities related to intelligence gathering, surveillance, enforcement, external operations, espionage, and what is related to political organizations and organizations, etc. We have classified the first part of the main departments into 20 departments initially, and under them come minor departments and then divisions. The main departments include the following:

• Internal Intelligence Operations: Monitoring internal threats, including opposition and potential opposition activities within Houthi-controlled territory.
• External Intelligence Operations: Focus on gathering information about foreign adversaries and international developments that may affect the militia’s strategic interests. In addition to working to create commercial entities that provide cover for the militia’s illegal activities.
• Counterintelligence: Engaging in measures to prevent infiltration and espionage by rival factions or foreign intelligence agencies.
• Surveillance operations: Conduct surveillance on key individuals, opposition movements, and other potential threats to Houthi control.
• Political Parties and Organizations: Collecting information on the political activities of international and local parties, organizations and organizations, including their plans, strategies and orientations. Monitoring activities and submitting reports to take action based on the analysis of the information. This may include recommendations for kidnappings of individuals in parties, organizations, independent activists or media professionals.

Main characters

• Abdul Hakim Hashim Ali Al-Khaywani

The head of the security and intelligence service of the Houthi militia, with the rank of major general, is one of the leaders who are extremely loyal to the leader of the Houthi group.

His first official appearance was through a decision by the militia’s Revolutionary Committee No. 207 dated July 2016, where he was appointed Deputy Minister of the Interior (Document 3). This was the same time that the Security and Intelligence Service was secretly formed, and he was the head of the service from that secret period until it was announced in 2019.

It seems that the appointment to the Ministry of Interior was a cover operation carried out by the militia to enable Al-Khaiwani to form the apparatus and select individuals loyal to the militia, whether in the Ministry of Interior or other agencies.

• Abdul Qader Ahmed Al Shami

Abdul Qader Al-Shami was appointed as deputy head of the apparatus with the rank of major general in 2016 in secret, and then appeared publicly with the announcement of the formation of the apparatus in 2019. There is recent information indicating that he was transferred to another job or assigned a task in addition to his work.

Abdul Qader Al-Shami is believed to have a connection to the entity formed by the Houthi militia in February 2024 and called the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center ( HOCC) (1 ), along with Ahmed Hamed, the director of the office of Mahdi Al-Mashat, who is named head of the militia council. He is considered (HOCC is the entity responsible when ships are threatened in the Red Sea.

There are many relatives of Abdul Qader Al-Shami who work in international organizations and he may have played a role in recruiting them to serve the militia, whether by obtaining information or by directing funding or working to beautify the militia in the West, including Angham Al-Shami, the communications officer at the International Monetary Fund in Washington, as well as Ahmed Al-Shami, director of the Arab Organization for Human Rights, which is one of the hands of the Houthis in the West and its office in America, in partnership with Muhammad Reda Al-Wazir, whom we mentioned in the reports of the secret Houthi organization in international organizations and funds (2 and 3) and how it also facilitated Ahmed Al-Shami’s appearance as a neutral person from institutions such as DeepRoot by Raafat Al-Akhaly and the Hikma Program by Abeer Al-Mutawakel, Al-Akhaly’s wife.

• Ahmed Mohammed Yahya Hamed (Abu Mahfouz):

Ahmed Hamed has been the office manager of Mahdi Al-Mashat, the head of the Houthi militia’s political council since they took control of Sana’a until now. His first appearance was in an official decision by the militia in 2016 as a member of the media committee of the political council by decision No. 17 of 2016 (Document 4).

He is considered the de facto ruler of the militia and the representative of the leader of the Houthi group. He is the main supervisor of all the councils and committees formed by the Houthis. He is also considered the main supervisor of the Supreme Council for Humanitarian Relief (SKMsha) affiliated with the Houthi militia, which was recently abolished and the International Cooperation Sector was incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Document 5). This aims to cover up all the corruption and operations in which (SKMsha) participated during the past period.

He is also the first official, according to various sources, of the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center ( HOCC ) with Abdul Qader Al-Shami. The Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center ( HOCC ) is considered responsible for threatening ships in the Red Sea.

He also coordinates with shipping companies that appear to take bribes to ensure that they are not hit even if they have nothing to do with what he claims. As we mentioned in the report on the sinking of the ship Robimar in April 2024, the Houthi militia has deals with international mafias, whether to dump hazardous waste at sea or sink ships that are close to expiring. Here is another deal related to insurance, so the militia created this entity or center and created an official formula for it to be able to communicate with companies and organizations and conclude deals under its cover.

Among the tasks of this center ( HOCC ) is “adherence to Islamic teachings and compliance with international humanitarian law and other relevant international laws and charters in a manner that does not conflict with or harm the interests of the Republic of Yemen.” Is this true and has the militia committed to this statement?!

• Abdul Salam Salah Ahmed Fleita

Abdul Salam Salah Ahmed Fleita is an important player in the militia’s external operations. He is the militia’s official spokesman abroad and their representative in international negotiations and meetings.

While his civilian name is registered, he uses the nom de guerre Mohammed Abdul Salam for operational security. He also coordinates the supply of money and weapons to the militia and smuggles them through multiple networks and companies under the cover of commercial, investment and transportation companies, assisted in organizing them by Ahmed Al-Shami and Abdulmalik Al-Ajri. His responsibilities include the following:

• Coordination with key figures: Close cooperation with Hassan al-Kahlani and Abdul Wahid Abu Ras (foreign operations of the security and intelligence apparatus) as well as Ahmed al-Shami to align Houthi interests abroad. This cooperation enhances the militia’s ability to manage its international relations and operational objectives.
• Intelligence and Logistics: Assist with logistical planning for operations that may take place outside Yemen, and ensure the smooth flow of resources and information to support Houthi objectives.
• Abdul Wahid Naji Mohammed Abu Ras

He is one of the Houthi leaders who does not appear often and his work is surrounded by high secrecy. Since the beginning of the formation of the Security and Intelligence Service in 2016, he was appointed as the Deputy for External Operations Affairs.

Abu Ras, who is responsible for external operations, plays a crucial role in coordinating the Houthi militia’s activities outside its borders, and his responsibilities may include:

• Intelligence gathering: Gathering information on foreign adversaries and potential allies to inform Houthi strategies.
• Cross-border operations: Managing operations that extend into neighboring regions, particularly in the Horn of Africa, where militias are known to be involved in arms smuggling and other illicit activities. Such as drug trafficking and even covert coordination operations to dismantle the diplomatic front of Yemeni embassies abroad affiliated with the legitimacy
• Networking: Establishing connections with international actors that may support the Houthi agenda or facilitate operational capabilities.

Under the management of Abu Ras comes the External Operations Department, which is managed by Hassan Al-Kahlani. It is likely that Al-Kahlani has become an agent instead of Abu Ras, so that Abu Ras can devote himself to organizing operations in the Horn of Africa.

• Hassan Ahmed Hassan Al-Kahlani

Amer Ali Amer Al-Marani and his brothers Al-Hassan and Mutlaq Al-Marani

When the political and national security apparatuses were merged with the security and intelligence apparatus, some of the leadership positions changed, but the structure of the apparatus seems to have remained the same, and people were transferred from military intelligence to the apparatus. Through the documents and data that were available, it is possible to track their transfer from one location to another, such as Amer Al-Marani.

Amer Al-Marani was in military intelligence and was assigned to the team to investigate the killing of Saleh Al-Samad, head of the political council of the Houthi militia in April 2018 (Document 9)

Then in October 2019 he was appointed governor of Al-Jawf, and in April 2021 another governor of Al-Jawf was appointed in his place and he was appointed Minister of Transport, and currently he has been transferred to a new position that appears within the apparatus and he is a major general within the militia

His brother, Al-Hassan Ali Amer Al-Marani (), who is believed to have been killed in Al-Jawf, was appointed in 2018 as the agency’s deputy for internal security affairs. Before that, he was appointed by the militia as the deputy for political security, which was merged with the security and intelligence agency. He was the head of the investigation team into the killing of Al-Samad in April 2018. He was also given the Houthi militia medal in September 2019, along with other people, including Hassan Ali Hassan Al-Kahlani.

His brother, Mutlaq Amer Al-Marani, is likely currently the agency’s deputy for internal security affairs, replacing his brother Al-Hassan. Mutlaq has been on the Security Council’s sanctions list since September 2022.

• Qasim Ahmed Qasim Al Hamran (Abu Ahmed)

Qasim Ahmed Qasim Al-Hamran was in the security and intelligence apparatus and still is, albeit in a hidden manner. The militia appointed him in July 2019 as Deputy Minister of Local Administration. He is one of the most loyal leaders to the leader of the Houthi group and is considered one of the first generation.

Al-Hamran was responsible for the Houthis’ secret field surveys in a number of governorates in 2013, which aimed to collect information about supporters and opponents of the Houthi group. His name appeared in the survey files for Al-Bayda Governorate. It is clear, according to the data and the structure used in some documents, that Al-Hamran was a secret supervisor and governor of Al-Bayda in 2013. (Documents 14 and 15)

Sana'a University awarded Qasim Ahmed Al-Hamran a doctorate degree in February 2022. This also shows the militia's targeting and distorting of education in Yemen and its leaders obtaining higher degrees that they do not deserve.

Al-Hamran’s relatives and his nephews, including 7 of them, are present in the apparatus and hold positions within the departments and administrations of counter-terrorism, investigations, the economic department, and ports (such as Abdul Hakim Al-Hamran, Ibrahim Al-Hamran, Abdul Rahim Al-Hamran, Taha Al-Hamran, Abdul Malik Al-Hamran). There is also the director of the apparatus’ branch in Saada, Hassan Abdul Rahim Qasim Al-Hamran.

• Qasim Qasim Ahsan Ali Al Hamran (Abu Kawthar)

Qasim Qasim Ahsan Ali Al-Hamran is a relative of Qasim Ahmed Al-Hamran, and he is currently the commander of the militia’s support and backup battalions, which were formed in 2020. Al-Hamran appeared in 2022 as the commander of these battalions and was given the rank of brigadier general. (8)

The Support and Reinforcement Battalions are a jihadist formation of the militia, and are adopted as a reserve force entrusted with combat missions on fronts with no specific geographical scope. They have adopted a slogan that sanctifies symbols of sectarian thought, taken from the slogans of entities affiliated with Iran and groups loyal to it. Their formation comes within the formation of other ideological forces that the militia has established over the past years as parallel forces subject to its movement formation and linked to its leader.

Al-Hamran moved between several organizational and leadership positions, from Deputy Chairman of the Executive Office of the militia until the end of 2019, then Supervisor and Deputy Minister of Education for the militia in 2021, then he appeared in 2022 as the commander of the militia’s support and backup battalions.

Also, Sana'a University awarded Qasim Qasim Al-Hamran a PhD in December 2023.

• Ahmed Abdel Ali Ahmed Al Shami

Ahmed Al-Shami holds American citizenship. As soon as the Houthi militia took control, he returned from America and was appointed in 2016 as a member of the Houthi militia’s economic committee by Resolution No. 17. He was also considered one of the militia’s official spokesmen in many international television interviews.

He is considered the special commercial coordinator for the businesses and companies affiliated with the militia and Abdul Salam Fleitah, arranging and coordinating their registration in countries outside Yemen, and coordinating with the individuals who own these companies, which work in illegal activities such as smuggling weapons and many equipment to the Houthi militia, in addition to working to control the companies affiliated with the militia over many commercial sectors such as medicines, spare parts, and others, as he holds American citizenship, he moves to Europe from Britain, Switzerland, Germany to America and even East Asia, and also uses as a cover the American human rights center that he and Muhammad Reda Al-Wazir follow, the “Arab Organization for Human Rights ( ARWA )” registered in America. (11)

Through tracking, Ahmed Al-Shami appears as a neutral person and cooperates with institutions that work with organizations (such as DeepRoot and the Hikma Program of Raafat Al-Akhaly and Abeer Al-Mutawakel) and participates and attends international meetings as director of the Arab Organization for Human Rights ( ARWA) (12 ) and through this he also works closely with the UN envoy to Yemen.

This, in turn, plays an influential role in directing the policies and decisions of the UN envoy in favor of the Houthi militia. An example of the pressures exerted by the UN envoy to stop the procedures of the Central Bank in Aden in July 2024 can be mentioned.

The Houthi security and intelligence apparatus’ organizational structure is designed to support a range of operations, both domestically and internationally. By appointing key figures such as Abdul Wahid Naji Mohammed Abu Ras, Hassan al-Kahlani, Abdul Salam Salah Ahmed Fleita, and Ahmed al-Shami to critical roles, the militia ensures its ability to effectively collect intelligence, manage security threats, and conduct operations that advance its strategic objectives.

Understanding this structure is essential to analyzing the militia’s capabilities and ongoing influence in the region, particularly in the context of creating multilateral arms smuggling and illicit activities that undermine regional stability, as well as impacts at various levels within the UN and its organizations.

Military promotions to attract loyalties

Since the Houthi militia entered Sana’a in 2015, it has worked through its revolutionary committee to infiltrate the various security and military agencies. Through recommendations from the leaders of the Houthi security and intelligence apparatus, many individuals in these agencies received rapid, illegal, or non-hierarchical and work-based promotions, reflecting the militia’s focus on loyalty and operational effectiveness. These promotions are crucial to maintaining morale and ensuring that loyal individuals and leaders direct the militia’s security efforts.

The promotion decisions included hundreds of figures. We mention the main figures who were promoted and brought into the Security and Intelligence Service and hold key positions within it, loyal to the head of the service, as follows:

• Tariq Muhammad Ahmad Yahya al-Hadi: Al-Hadi was promoted to the rank of Major General in 2017. His rise through the ranks and positions indicates the extent of his loyalty to the militia and his importance within the militia’s military structure.
• Mohammed Abbas Abdullah Mohammed Amer: Amer was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and has maintained this rank since 2017. (Document 19). He currently serves as the agency’s deputy for financial and administrative affairs, and his firm position reflects his established role within the militia, indicating that he bears significant responsibilities in overseeing various operations.

Kidnapping and coercive tactics

The Houthi militia has gained a notorious reputation for using kidnapping and coercion tactics as tools of repression and control within the territories it occupies. These actions are part of a broader strategy to eliminate dissent, intimidate potential opponents, and instill fear among the population. The militia’s tactics are emblematic of its approach to governance in a conflict-torn environment where any opposition or criticism is met with swift and often brutal reprisals.

Kidnapping of journalists, civil society activists and staff of organizations

The militia has been implicated in numerous kidnappings targeting journalists, activists, civil society leaders, and even staff of organizations. These individuals are often seen as a threat to the Houthi narrative or as potential sources of information that could undermine the militia’s authority or interests.

• Targeting the media: Journalists are particularly vulnerable to kidnapping as the Houthi militia seeks to suppress independent reporting and control the flow of information.

Coercive tactics beyond kidnapping

In addition to kidnapping, the Houthi militia uses a variety of coercive tactics to maintain control over the population, including the following:

• Intimidation: The militia uses threats and intimidation as tools to deter dissent. Individuals who express opposition to Houthi policies or actions often face harassment, threats of violence, or even abduction. This climate of fear stifles political dissent and suppresses civil society participation.
• Targeting families: Militias don’t just target individuals, they often extend their coercive tactics to their families. The arrest or harassment of a family member can serve as a powerful deterrent to others, forcing them to remain silent out of fear for their loved ones.
• Public Trials and Confessions: The Houthi militia is known to hold public trials of detainees, using these events as propaganda tools. Coerced confessions are often presented to legitimize the militia’s actions and portray opponents as criminals or traitors.
• Use of informants: The militia employs a network of informants to monitor activities within communities. This surveillance creates a culture of distrust among citizens, as individuals fear reporting their conversations and actions to the authorities.

The Houthi militia’s tactics of kidnapping and coercion demonstrate a systematic approach to maintaining control and suppressing dissent and criticism in Yemen. By targeting journalists, activists, civil society leaders, and organization staff, the militia seeks to eliminate any opposition, expose or attempt to curb its corruption in relation to international funding, and instill a climate of fear.

The case of Hisham al-Hakimi is a chilling reminder of the extreme measures the militia is willing to use to silence critics and assert its dominance. Understanding these tactics is crucial to understanding the broader implications of the Houthi militia’s actions on human rights and political freedoms in Yemen.

Cover companies and arms smuggling

The Houthi militia, through the Security and Intelligence Service, has established a network of companies under its control under cover of secrecy and camouflage that operate in sectors seen as legitimate, such as spare parts, cosmetics imports, general trade, investment, transportation, and tourism. However, these businesses are often used as fronts for arms smuggling and other illicit activities, allowing the militia to generate revenue while concealing its true operations. This strategy highlights the militia’s adaptability and ability to exploit existing economic frameworks to support its military objectives.

Establishment of coverage companies

The militia approach involves setting up various companies that are ostensibly engaged in legitimate business activities. These companies are often strategically designed to deflect scrutiny from authorities, international organizations, and sanctions committees. Key characteristics of these cover companies include:

• Legitimate Front: Operating in sectors such as cosmetics, textiles, general trade, tourism, and transportation, these companies appear legitimate on the surface. This front allows the militia to conduct business without real oversight, thus facilitating its operations without significant outside interference.
• Registration outside Yemen: Many of these companies are registered outside Yemen, especially in the Sultanate of Oman. This practice serves multiple purposes:
• Legal Shield: Offshore company registration provides a form of legal protection and complicates the ability of international authorities to track and prosecute illegal activities.
• Sanctions evasion: By operating outside the jurisdiction of Yemeni law, the militia can circumvent sanctions imposed on individuals and organizations linked to its activities.
• Using different names: Companies often operate under different names and change them from time to time to disguise themselves and ensure diversion of monitoring and surveillance, further obscuring their true nature. While they may present themselves as separate entities, many are owned by the same individuals or connected through complex networks, allowing for seamless coordination between them.

Examples of some of the companies that have been monitored:

There are of course several companies formed by the militia through the Security and Intelligence Service and in coordination with Ahmed Al-Shami, the militia's foreign trade coordinator, in order to serve its goals, whether controlling trade in general and oil and gas trade in particular, in addition to using these companies in arms smuggling operations and naming some of them under companies for importing cosmetics, spare parts, transportation and general trade. Companies are also registered outside Yemen, specifically in the Sultanate of Oman and specifically in the Salalah region, under a new name, which may be in the same name as the owner of the company in Sana'a with other partners, or in the name of a new owner with whom coordination is carried out, who is basically one of the militia's loyalists or has worked with them in the security and military services.

Mohammed Saleh Al Shami Import Company

The company was registered in Sana'a in 2020 under the name of Muhammad Saleh Al-Shami and under the activity of importing accessories, cosmetics, cars and their spare parts.

Companies are registered outside Yemen, specifically in the Sultanate of Oman, under another name and with the same owner as the company in Sana'a, with other partnerships. Muhammad Saleh Al-Shami established another company (Sky Line for Transport and Business) in the Sultanate of Oman in Salalah, with registration number 1395058, and it was registered in 2021 in partnership with his brother Abdul Hakim and another person. (Document 21) Of course, according to tracking, the company operates in several activities registered in its commercial register (Document 22). It is also clear that the company's register in the Sultanate of Oman has not been renewed, as it expired in August 2024. This indicates that the militia and its partners may have created a new camouflage for another company under another name to avoid follow-up and accountability.

Mohammed Saleh Mohammed Al Shami is one of the prominent individuals associated with this network of covered companies. His role in these businesses is significant for several reasons:

• Ownership and Management: Al-Shami co-owns and manages several businesses, providing the militia with a vital operational base. His connections and knowledge of business operations facilitate the militia’s ability to engage in multiple deals while maintaining a veneer of legitimacy.
• Expanding the network: Using al-Shami and others like him allows the militia to expand its business network, establishing connections with suppliers, customers, and international markets. This network is crucial for the militia to obtain weapons and other materials needed for its operations.

Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment Company (Abdulwali Abdo Hassan Al-Jabri) Arms Deals and Recruitment Operations

The Houthi militia also engages in arms deals and recruitment that further its military objectives. This aspect of the militia’s operations highlights its reliance on local and international networks to secure the weapons and personnel needed for its ongoing conflicts.

background:

Abdul Wali Abdo Hassan al-Jabri is a prominent member of the House of Representatives since the 2003 session (15) and a leading figure within the Houthi militia. His influence extends beyond politics, and during the war he was appointed by the Houthi militia as commander of the 115th Infantry Brigade with the rank of brigadier general, which plays a crucial role in the militia’s military operations. However, he was sentenced to death in absentia in 2020 by the legitimate government for his role in militia activities (Document 23), indicating the serious legal implications of his involvement.

His nephew, Jamil Hazaa Abdo Hassan Al-Jabri, was appointed as Chief of Staff of Operations in the same brigade and is currently a member of the Houthi Shura Council.

His brother, Abdul Wahid Al-Jabri, was appointed in 2018 by the militia to the Ministry of Interior and was also promoted (Document 24). He was a security supervisor in Al-Masrakh in Taiz Governorate and contributed to bringing the militia into Taiz, then a security supervisor in the Sabr District in Taiz Governorate.

Abdul Wali Al-Jabri then moved to the Sultanate of Oman in coordination with Abdul Salam Feliteh, the militia’s representative, as well as Abdul Malik Al-Ajri and Ahmed Al-Shami, the militia’s commercial coordinator.

According to tracking through open sources, we found that Abdulwali Al-Jabri has two companies registered in Sana’a, one under the name Abdulwali Al-Jabri for Import and the second under the name Abdulwali Al-Jabri for Travel and Tourism (Document 25). It appears that their data, including the commercial registration number and date of establishment, have been hidden by the Houthi militia, and they may work at a later stage to delete this data after publishing this report.

In 2022, Al-Jabri established Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment Company in the Sultanate of Oman in Salalah under commercial registration number 1450240 (Document 26). The company operates under several diverse commercial activities, all of which are activated according to the document (Document 27). According to our sources, the company focused on working secretly in arms smuggling and concluding arms deals for the militia with several countries, including Russia.

• His company’s involvement: Al-Jabri’s company, Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment, is involved in arms deals, demonstrating how business operations can be intertwined with military objectives. This secrecy serves as a front for obtaining weapons and military supplies needed for the militia’s ongoing campaigns. The involvement of a political figure in the arms trade blurs the lines between governance and military activities, further complicating Yemen’s security landscape.
• Recruitment Efforts: Recently, Al-Jabri’s company has been linked to recruitment efforts involving Yemenis in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and an image of one of the contracts for recruiting Yemenis for this conflict through Al-Jabri’s company was leaked to the platform (Document 28). This indicates a strategy in which the militia seeks to take advantage of external conflicts to bolster its ranks, and recruit individuals who may be looking for work or adventure in military roles.

The name of Al-Jabri Company has recently appeared in several international reports, including one issued yesterday by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Center (OCCRP) in Britain, stating that the company contributed to recruiting a number of Yemenis in the Russian-Ukrainian war (16). In the past few days, many videos have appeared of these recruits who were upset about the situation and talked about the fact that they went as security guards and not to participate in the war and that their dues were not paid as agreed upon. (This includes the guarantee of human trafficking)

Human trafficking concerns

Several international reports have recently spoken about human trafficking practices involving companies recruiting Yemenis for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (16). This raises significant ethical concerns and highlights the desperate circumstances some Yemenis may find themselves in due to the ongoing conflict and economic instability in the region. Militia recruitment tactics may exploit vulnerable individuals, contributing to broader issues of human rights abuses and violations of international law.

The Houthi militia’s approach to military promotions, its involvement in arms deals, and its recruitment drive demonstrate a multi-faceted strategy aimed at consolidating power and enhancing military capabilities. The promotions of key figures within the security and intelligence apparatus ensure that experienced leaders continue to shape the militia’s operations.

At the same time, the links between political figures like Abdulwali al-Jabri and the arms trade underscore the complex interplay between governance and military activity in Yemen. Understanding these dynamics is crucial to understanding the ongoing conflict and the challenges facing addressing accountability and human rights issues in the region.

Coordination and arrangement processes

Ahmed al-Shami (mentioned at the beginning of this report), who is described as the economic coordinator of these companies and a member of the militia’s economic committee, plays a vital role in facilitating arms deals and transactions disguised as legitimate trade. His involvement includes:

• Strategic Planning: As the economic coordinator, Al-Shami is responsible for developing strategies that allow the militia to maximize profits from these cover businesses. This includes identifying profitable markets, negotiating deals, and managing the logistics of arms procurement and distribution.
• Facilitating Transactions: Al-Shami coordinates the financial aspects of these operations, ensuring that funds are transferred and laundered effectively to support arms smuggling without attracting undue attention. This may involve complex financial maneuvers, including the use of offshore accounts and shell companies.
• International Relations: His role extends to building relationships with international entities that may be unwittingly involved in the militia’s operations. By presenting these businesses as legitimate, Al-Shami can facilitate transactions that enable the militia to obtain weapons and materials while maintaining plausible deniability.

Implications for regional security

The Houthi militia's use of secret companies to conclude suspicious secret deals, whether to purchase equipment, buy weapons, smuggle weapons, or even recruit Yemenis in the Russian-Ukrainian war, has major repercussions on regional security:

• Arms proliferation: By engaging in arms smuggling, the militia contributes to the proliferation of weapons in a volatile region, exacerbating existing conflicts and undermining efforts to achieve peace and stability.
• Ambiguous Accountability: The use of legitimate fronts complicates the ability of international authorities to hold militias accountable for their actions. This challenges efforts to impose sanctions or investigate illicit arms trafficking.
• Economic Disruption: The operation of these covered companies can disrupt legitimate businesses in the areas in which they operate, leading to unfair competition and economic instability.

The Houthi militia’s creation of this type of company is a sophisticated strategy to facilitate arms smuggling while presenting an official image. By operating in seemingly legitimate sectors and using individuals such as Mohammed Saleh Mohammed al-Shami, al-Jabri, Ahmed al-Shami, and other cover names, the militia can effectively conceal its illicit activities.

This approach not only supports its military objectives, but also poses significant challenges to regional security and international law enforcement efforts. Understanding these dynamics is critical to addressing the broader implications of Houthi militia actions in Yemen and the surrounding areas.

Monitoring and data collection

The Houthi militia has established a robust surveillance and data collection system, which plays a critical role in its efforts to maintain control and monitor dissent within the territories it occupies. This extensive surveillance apparatus has been designed to collect information on both supporters and opponents since before the militia entered Sana’a and specifically since 2012, allowing the militia to effectively manage and respond to potential threats.

It is clear upon examining the documents and looking at the type of data on the basis of which the information was collected that there is support and assistance for these militias from international organizations and specialists to identify this type and use coding and analysis.

Monitoring operations

The Houthi militia uses various methods to conduct surveillance, including:

• Human Intelligence ( HUMINT ): Militias use informants and undercover agents to gather information from within communities. These individuals often provide reports on population activities, loyalties, and sentiments, providing the militia with real-time intelligence.
• Electronic Surveillance: The militia has invested in technology that enables it to monitor communications, including phone calls, messages, and social media interactions. This capability allows the militia to track opposition activities and collect data on individuals who may pose a threat.
• Physical surveillance: Houthi elements conduct on-the-ground surveillance to monitor individuals and groups they consider suspicious. This can include following individuals, monitoring gatherings, and gathering information about their movements and associations.

Keep detailed records

The militia keeps detailed records of individuals and their political affiliations, which form the basis of its intelligence operations. Important files obtained by the Frodowiki platform from 2013, which the militia used to survey a number of governorates, illustrate this practice:

Names and Classifications for the year 2013: This file (in Excel format) contains thousands of names, including a file containing 1919 individuals in the governorates of the capital, Amanat Al-Asimah, and Sana’a Governorate, and other files that include hundreds of names in other governorates such as Al-Bayda Governorate, in addition to various details used to classify them according to loyalty, political orientation, and level of effectiveness. The classifications include the following:

• Loyalists: Individuals who support the Houthi cause and can be considered allies.
• Opponents: Those identified as dissidents or potential threats to Houthi authority.
• Neutral parties: Individuals who do not publicly express support or opposition but can still be monitored for their activities and affiliations.

Among the prominent figures involved in the survey process, mentioned at the beginning of paragraph 2.2 of this report, is “Qasim Ahmed Qasim Al-Hamran,” (see documents 14 and 15), who has continued to play a key role within the militia. His involvement highlights the militia’s reliance on individuals most loyal to the Houthi leader to oversee intelligence operations and ensure the effectiveness of data collection efforts.

Qasim Al-Hamran’s role: Al-Hamran’s position within the militia suggests that he plays an important role in shaping the strategies used for surveillance and data collection. His insights into community dynamics and loyalty patterns are valuable to the militia’s decision-making processes.

Involvement in covert operations: Al-Hamran is also believed to be involved in covert operations aimed at suppressing dissent. His understanding of the local landscape enables the militia to carry out targeted actions against individuals identified as threats based on data collected.

The Houthi militia’s extensive surveillance and data collection efforts are integral to its strategy to maintain control and manage dissent in Yemen. By conducting extensive surveillance, maintaining detailed records, and using surveys to gather intelligence, the militia can effectively monitor the loyalties and affiliations of individuals within its territory. This approach not only helps identify potential threats, but also helps the militia consolidate its power and stifle dissent. Understanding these tactics is essential to understanding the broader implications of Houthi militia governance and its impact on human rights and civil liberties in the region.

Here we renew the warning to the legitimate government authorities in the areas under their control to pay attention to the surveys conducted by the organizations and their partners. It was previously published about suspicious and security surveys conducted by the European Institute for Peace and its consultants, Huda Al-Salahi and Hisham Al-Omaisi (17). It is also important for the legitimacy to review and investigate with the parties affiliated with it, which may include officials who facilitated and enabled the continuation of such surveys.

The role of international organizations and civil society institutions in Yemen

It is clear that there is a hidden role for some international organizations in Yemen as well as civil society institutions to provide various support to this militia, whether previously and it is clear from the type of data found in the Houthi militia surveys in 2013. This work is not the work of the Houthi militia, but rather it appears that it was done through the assistance and support of organizations and intelligence services that provided services to them and still do.

Or whether this support is currently evident through facilitating the access of funds to the militia's Humanitarian Relief Council (SCMCHA) or through exerting pressure through organizations to stop decisions against the militia, including classifying it as a terrorist group at the end of Donald Trump's rule in 2020, or even what happened recently from the pressure exerted by the United Nations and its UN envoy to stop the decisions of the Central Bank in Aden and pressure on the legitimate government under the pretext of human suffering and the economy.

The role of international organizations in Yemen:

): Through the funding it received, which amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars during the war period, all of which was managed by the militia, in addition to the fact that it delivered to the militia many four-wheel drive vehicles such as ambulances, which the militia used to support its war fronts and security apparatuses and to transport its soldiers, and it roamed the streets of the capital, Sana’a (22), in full view and hearing of this organization.

The organization manipulated the Yemeni currency exchange rate and exploited the difference in currency exchange rates between the areas controlled by the legitimate government and the areas controlled by the Houthi militia, and looted the rights of these families through the banking game at rates exceeding 50% and reaching hundreds of millions of dollars, not to mention the operating budgets, in partnership with the militia and with the strange silence of the legitimate government. This, of course, enabled the militia to seize funds to support and continue its war in Yemen and support its various agencies.

The role of some civil society institutions in Yemen

While this report sheds light on a serious issue of the roles and threats of the Houthi security and intelligence apparatus, it also reveals the roles of some civil society institutions in Yemen in covering up the crimes of this apparatus and beautifying its members with a crooked side and bringing them to decision-making centers in international organizations.

Previous reports have also revealed the role of these institutions in diverting a large portion of international funding directed to support Yemen during the conflict period into the hands of the Houthi militia (previous reference 20). There is cooperation and partnership as well as a conflict of roles between officials of some international organizations and civil society institutions operating in Yemen, and some of them receive large amounts of funding without properly declaring it.

Some documents indicate possible links between some of these organizations and the terrorist Houthi group and providing various services to this militia, whether by beautifying it in the West or by attracting its leaders and enabling them to attend international meetings and building relationships with UN and Western officials and showing them as neutral individuals or to the point of mobilizing efforts to stop any decisions that may be taken against the militia, whether such as decisions to classify it as a terrorist group or decisions related to the Yemeni economy, which may play a role in stopping the Houthi militia's control of the economy. In addition, some of these institutions play a role in covering up the crimes of the Houthi militia, represented by kidnappings, torture and killing, and they issue suspicious reports against the legitimate government to divert attention from the militia's actions against humanitarian law. Our report stresses the need to conduct in-depth investigations to review the performance of these institutions and hold accountable those with long hands, and recover wasted or financial funds.

The role of the Citizenship Foundation

Mwatana is a non-governmental organization run by Radhia Al-Mutawakel. This organization aligns itself with the Houthi militia and falsely claims neutrality and working to promote democracy and human rights. Unfortunately, it has not played any role in exposing the kidnappings, torture, and killings carried out by the Houthi militia inside the prisons of the Security and Intelligence Service. It has continued to focus only in its roles and reports on distorting the legitimate government.

“Citizenship” receives tens of millions of dollars in grants, including, for example, a grant of 1.4 million euros in 2021 (26). This funding reflects the extent of international support for the soft power of the terrorist Houthi militia. The militia has not declared in any way the fate of the received funds and the methods of their use.

The role of the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies

The Sana'a Center for Studies was established in 2014 and is an independent research center, as it describes itself. This center plays a role in deflecting pressure from the Houthi militia, as represented in its position during the classification of the Houthi militia as a terrorist group during the era of Donald Trump in 2020, where it mobilized efforts, held meetings, and submitted statements with many activists affiliated with them and other institutions such as Resonance Yemen and DeepRoot to work on canceling this classification under the pretext of the humanitarian crisis and the deteriorating economic situation (27, 28, and 29).

The center also receives tens of millions of dollars in grants, including, for example, $4 million to hold a peace forum in the Netherlands in 2023 (30), where it brought figures from the leadership of the Houthi militia as peace activists and neutrals, including Jamal Amer, who was recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Houthi militia.

Given the history of the center’s formation and its presence in Sana’a in 2014, questions arise about: “Did the Sana’a Center secretly contribute to supporting and assisting the Houthi militia in conducting surveys that were conducted in the period before the militia entered Sana’a through its advisors, some of whom appear to have no opposition to the Houthis or to be loyal to them to varying degrees?”

The role of DeepRoot Foundation and the Hikma Program

The activities of Raafat Al-Akhaly and his wife come against the backdrop of serious allegations related to his portrayal of Houthi leaders as neutral individuals and activists and advocates of peace, which enabled these individuals to reach and establish relationships with UN agencies and to introduce and enable leading Houthi figures to attend international meetings and give speeches at the Human Rights Council. This figure is accused of war crimes, such as Abdul Qader Al-Murtada.

• Ahmed Abdel Ali Ahmed Al-Shami: This institution and program presented him in more than one international forum and even attended a meeting in 2021 with the US envoy to Yemen as the director of a human rights organization (the Arab Organization for Human Rights “ ARWA ”). Attached is a photo of the meeting (33). He, Ahmed Al-Shami, as we mentioned at the beginning of this report in paragraph 2.2, is one of the Houthi leaders and a member of the militia’s economic committee and the commercial coordinator for Houthi cross-border companies that are active in illegal activities such as arms smuggling.
• Amir al-Din Jahaf: This institution and program also presented him in more than one international forum as a human rights activist (34), but he is more accurately a Houthi leader (35) and owns an institution called the Insan Foundation that apparently works to defend human rights, but in reality it is one of the institutions created by the militia apparatuses to beautify its image in the West and push the Houthi narrative in the forefront before the UN agencies, and this is what was made clear in the reports and the secret organization of the Houthis in international organizations and funds (previous reference 3).

Through the roles of Al-Akhaly and Al-Mutawakkil that we mentioned, Ahmed Al-Shami, Amir Al-Din Jahaf and their institutions were able to reach the corridors of the United Nations, and Al-Shami even came to identify himself as working close to the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Yemen (36).

At a later stage, they (Al-Shami and Jahaf, with the assistance of Muhammad Redha Al-Wazir and through their institutions) worked to enable one of the security elements of the Houthi militia, Abdul Qader Al-Murtada, who is responsible for Houthi prisons and is accused of torturing prisoners in Houthi militia prisons, to give a speech via the Internet at the Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2019 (37). This situation raises ethical concerns about the participation of individuals with such serious allegations in high-level international platforms.

Al-Murtada’s participation in this event was facilitated by the Arab Organization for Human Rights (ARWA), led by Mohammad Reda al-Wazir and Ahmed al-Shami, as well as the Insan Organization, affiliated with Amir al-Din Jahaf. This connection highlights how militias exploit organizations that claim to defend human rights to advance their agenda.

accountability issues

The involvement of organizations such as the Sana’a Center, Mwatana, DeepRoot , and the Hikma Program in facilitating the appearance of Houthi leaders in international forums raises important questions about accountability:

• Access to international platforms: There are pressing concerns about how these institutions access influential international platforms. Their ability to present Houthi figures as advocates of peace and development while ignoring their direct involvement in human rights abuses reflects a worrying dynamic in international diplomacy.
• Lack of Accountability: The failure to hold these institutions accountable for their roles in advancing Houthi interests under the guise of humanitarian work is deeply troubling. It highlights a broader issue of accountability within the international community, where actors with questionable human rights records can manipulate perceptions to their advantage.
• Conclusion

  The complex dynamics of the Houthi militia’s operations reveal a multifaceted approach to governance, security, and international relations. The creation of the Security and Intelligence Service has enabled the militia to effectively consolidate power while using extensive surveillance and data collection strategies to monitor supporters and opponents alike.

  Key figures within the militia, such as Abdul Wahid Naji Muhammad Abu Ras, Hassan al-Kahlani, and Abdul Salam Salah Ahmed Fleita, play crucial roles in coordinating intelligence activities and managing military operations, strengthening the militia’s grip on power, in addition to its various kidnappings, torture, and killings inside Yemen.

  The militia’s use of clandestine companies through its commercial coordinator Ahmed al-Shami to smuggle and recruit weapons reflects its ability to adapt to a complex conflict environment. These operations not only enhance the militia’s military capabilities, but also pose significant challenges to regional security and stability. The involvement of political figures such as Abdul-Wali Abdo Hassan al-Jaberi in illicit arms deals underscores the intertwining of governance and military operations within the Houthi framework.

  Moreover, the kidnappings of activists, media professionals, and employees of international organizations, the methods of torture, and the various malicious charges that may also be a kind of partnership to cover up corruption raise a broad question about accountability and the effectiveness of international mechanisms designed to support human rights. This in turn raises the question about the role of some civil society institutions in Yemen in presenting some Houthi militia leaders as neutral and developmentally oriented figures in international forums, which complicates the narrative surrounding the militia.

  Their engagement with organizations such as the Sana'a Center and DeepRoot is exciting. The Hikma Fellowship Program raises important questions about accountability and the effectiveness of international mechanisms designed to track and investigate such cases.

  As the situation in Yemen continues to evolve, understanding these dynamics is essential to understanding the broader implications of the Houthi militia’s actions. The interplay between military promotions, surveillance tactics, arms deals, and international relations highlights the urgent need for the international community to address the ongoing humanitarian crisis and ensure that efforts to achieve peace and stability are genuine, effective, and comprehensive. The challenges posed by the Houthi militia underscore the complexity of the conflict in Yemen and the critical importance of holding all actors accountable for their actions.

  Source: FraudWiki