Al-Aqsa Flood and Iran's Dilemma

After October 7, the United States and Israel were convinced that Iran would be content with supporting Hamas only in the media, including naive threats to wipe out the Zionist entity, while Iran believed that Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa had indeed shaken the entity and threatened its fate, and it wanted to attribute this operation to itself, so it used its proxies to intervene in the battle in a limited manner, expecting that this intervention would not prompt Israel to respond directly to it.

For Israel, the situation was not suitable for entering into a fictitious battle with Iran because its prestige was still wasted, and it saw itself as the strongest in the region. It decided to deter Iran by bombing its consulate in Damascus and at the same time to find out how serious it was about participating in the battle. However, the Iranian response was weak and did not rise to the level of the threat. This encouraged Israel to go further, so it assassinated the most important figures, starting with the Iranian president and his foreign minister, then Haniyeh in Tehran, and reaching the leaders of Hezbollah, including its secretary-general, along with many Iranian leaders.

These assassinations were supposed to push Iran to respond more decisively, but it responded again in a weak manner that had a much greater media impact than it had in reality. Its missiles did not cause any damage that might terrify Israel, but rather showed that it has no intention of fighting any battle - currently - even as it sees its strongest arms in the region being uprooted by Israel. This message carries two interpretations: the first is that Iran does not intend to take risks and fears entering into a direct war with Israel, and the second is that Iran is actually incapable of entering into a direct war and that its latest response is the strongest it can do.

After a year of Israeli aggression on Gaza, the extent of Hamas’s cohesion in the face of all Israeli attempts at penetration, whether in its political and military structure or even in its communications system, has become clear. On the other hand, the extent of Israel’s penetration of Iran militarily and politically is no longer hidden. There is much evidence of these penetrations, not the last of which is the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in the capital, Tehran, after he attended the inauguration ceremony of the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and its inability to even determine the extent of the Israeli penetration. The same applies to Hezbollah, which, when it decided to change its communications system to prevent spying, Israel had prepared a shipment of the new system. What the party thought was a strong fortification became the most important exposed loophole for the enemy. This may raise doubts even about the source of the decision to change the party’s communications system, not just the deal to purchase it. If Israeli penetrations have reached this extent with respect to Iran and Hezbollah, how far can they go with respect to the Houthis? What can Israel do to the Houthis?!

When talking about this war, its direct parties are not the only ones active regionally, but are affected by the policies of the major countries. The United States, for example, is committed to its position in supporting Israel no matter what, while the change in Russia’s position is evident, as it had never taken hostile positions towards Israel before the Al-Aqsa Flood and tried to remain neutral at first by condemning the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, then tried to be a mediator before announcing its position against the Israeli massacres and hosting Hamas delegations. However, its role remained hidden regarding the escalation of tension in the region, which serves it in distracting attention from its war with Ukraine and may also reduce the volume of Western military support for Ukraine and transfer part of it to Israel.

Russia seeks to maintain its good relations with Iran, which is a strategic partner in Syria, while at the same time maintaining its relations with Israel and focusing its criticism more on the American position on the war and the Palestinian issue as a whole. This brings us back to the question of Russia’s relationship with the Israeli strikes against Iranian targets in Syria, and whether Moscow had a role in removing Bashar al-Assad’s regime from what is happening or perhaps preventing further restrictions that could strangle Israel even more. The Russian position can be described as being with everyone and against everyone at the same time. Even if this position does not directly serve Hamas, it will not harm it at least. Hamas’s political maturity has made it able to benefit from any positions that support it, even if they are simple, and it can also limit the impact of positions that oppose it, even if they are major, which means that Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa was a military translation of this policy.