Trump is President Again... What Does This Mean for Yemen?

The US elections take up a great deal of attention because of America’s standing and influence in and on the world. But this election was a greater concern because it is pivotal and carries within it the seeds of a radical transformation in one of the strongest democracies.

The transformations are not limited to the American domestic sphere, which Trump promises in a detailed election plan of nearly a thousand pages prepared by the Heritage Foundation .

Trump appears more ideologically mature than before, has a political vision for what America will be like, and carries a detailed program that will make the deep state in America a Trump state for years to come, because he is preparing - unlike his predecessors - to change the features of American institutions by creating new ones and employing nearly 24,000 employees at various administrative levels. (The list is ready, and the above institution conducted interviews in previous months)

Rather, these changes extend beyond America through a reformulation of the Atlantic alliance, determining the course of the American-Chinese competition, deciding the fate of the war in Ukraine, and of course pushing the course of the conflict in our region, which is called the Middle East, towards a new stream that includes strengthening financially expensive utilitarian alliances with some countries, limiting Iran, giving Israel a free hand, and perhaps strengthening the position of Erdogan’s Türkiye.

But without going on to say and repeat what has been said, I would like to address what might happen to Yemen in the new Trump era, in which Trump will have full powers without parliamentary opposition for at least two years, and of course with judicial powers that no previous American president has enjoyed.

We must first provide a summary of the Yemeni scene. A country divided in terms of actual authority between the Houthi group and the legitimate government, the latter the result of contradictory alliances, with fragile economic capabilities and total external dependence.

The Houthi group joined the Iranian axis in practice in the name of supporting Gaza and became a real threat to international security and global trade and navigation, and as a result received limited American, British, or Israeli military strikes, and for the first time Israel intervened militarily in Yemen since its establishment.

The situation in Yemen has settled down as the Arab military coalition has withdrawn from its military operations five years ago in exchange for accelerating the pace of reaching a faltering political deal with the Houthis that serves the Houthis’ interests - at least in terms of propaganda, since they have held out and have not suffered defeat and have emerged stronger than all the other Yemeni forces.

America supports a political solution in Yemen, but Houthi interference in international navigation has put major obstacles in the way of this peace, the details of which are primarily managed by Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, the opinion has become entrenched that there is no longer a horizon for using war in Yemen and changing the map of powers, especially since the coalition countries do not want the war to return and are prepared to make concessions that are essentially a reduction in the place and role of the Yemeni government.

Trump is naturally moody, seeks absolute profit and wants a strong America in the world. During his first term, he did not rush to wage war, but rather to make strange deals.

There is a great deal of reliance that the change in the US administration will lead to the resumption of the battle in Yemen and the Yemeni government will receive support in various forms. But Trump does not want to wage war for his soldiers, and he will not bear the burden of a military battle in Yemen alone, and he will not stand against the desire of Saudi Arabia, which does not want to return to the square of battles around it, especially in Yemen.

Therefore, resuming the war with an American green light and without a party paying the cost is unlikely, especially since the forces of legitimacy are divided in light of the Transitional Council’s stagnation regarding any new political formula that may be formed by the end of the battle with the Houthis.

However, there is a new party in the matter, which is Israel. The absolute victory that Netanyahu is promoting will only come by reducing the threats surrounding him, including the Houthi threat.

So if there is a party to intervene militarily in Yemen to strike Houthi targets, it will be Israel, and this may receive Trump’s blessing and assistance as an inexpensive part of his pledges to the entity.

Israel may take advantage of its morale and the rush of victory to redraw alliances in the region and form a new axis managed by it that includes opponents of the Iranian axis. Then the Yemeni government will be in a moral predicament with its people.

Perhaps the Houthis will resort to reducing their threats to international navigation and thus avoid any international military response, and Trump will do nothing more than confirm the current classification of the Houthi group or tighten the classification somewhat. But in both cases, this does not mean an existential threat to the Houthi group, which will go to activate peace to gain time and appease Saudi desires, and thus avoid the military path without reaching peace.

However, no one expects the reactions of Trump, who is really determined to crush Iran. The Houthis’ intervention in the war theater a year ago means that they have become a potential target in this crushing. To prevent an American confrontation with Iran, the Houthis may have a large share of American targeting. But does this mean that crushing Iran’s arm in Yemen will be coordinated with the Yemeni government and serve its interests? To answer this question, we can look at the results of the American or Israeli bombing of Houthi targets and what their benefits are for the Yemeni government.

The power map in Yemen has not changed and the government has not gained new positions because it has not advanced on the ground and has not been able to resume oil. And so it will be.

Trump's return seems to be an opportunity to change the power equations in Yemen. However, the government, first, is not prepared because it has not been able to bridge its forces, unify its intentions, create a political and popular bloc, and obtain weapons that guarantee firepower. It has also not recovered economically. I do not know whether it will be able to achieve these goals in half a year to seize the foreseeable opportunity.

Secondly, if the Yemeni government cannot build a direct relationship and open channels of communication with the Trump administration, those around him, and those who influence his policy, both individuals and institutions, and place itself on the map of his interests, it will be lost between the withdrawal of the Arab coalition and its unwillingness to return to war, and the arrogance of Israel, any intervention from which in Yemen turns into a temporary popular asset in favor of the Houthis and a curse on the government.

Third, the government can work on two tracks. A diplomatic track that changes the formula of the peace that has been building for some time and serves the interests of the Yemeni militias. And a military track that makes the war a reality that regional and international parties cannot help but engage in and in favor of the government’s desire. In other words, it must take the initiative to change the equation.

(From the author's page)