The Houthi group and the challenges of the current regional situation

The rounds of the Israeli-Iranian conflict, the latest of which was the Israeli attack on Iran on October 26, including the wars in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, imposed new challenges on the Houthi group, as it, as a party in the Islamic resistance camp loyal to Iran, is governed by these tensions and what results from them in terms of preparing itself for a battle that may be long to support its ally, and also to support the resistance fronts, in addition to, and most importantly, its submission to the regional and international condition and the tools of the actors in dealing with Iran and its agents.

The Israeli conflict against Iran and the resistance camp in the region has generated unprecedented security and logistical risks for the Houthi group, by imposing a new equation on it to adapt itself according to its conditions, with the possibility of it becoming a direct military target for Israel or its Western allies, whether at the level of targeting its leaders or individuals, or its military structure, including restricting its regional and local support networks. The group then developed its mechanisms to respond to these challenges, so that it finally adopted a preventive security policy aimed at protecting and securing its field leaders, in addition to reducing the presence of its political leaders in state institutions.

Security-wise, Israel’s targeting of influential leaders in the resistance camp, after the killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and, finally, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, weighed heavily on the Houthi group in terms of the level and type of risks that might affect it, and its similarity to Hezbollah and Hamas in the effectiveness of the central role of the leader, who not only tops its political and religious pyramid in the case of the group, but also organizes its relationship with its local and regional surroundings, and directs activities to support the Islamic resistance, including directing weekly demonstrations in areas under the group’s control. The killing of influential leaders in the resistance camp put the group’s leader in the spotlight, and thus raised the levels of protection, in addition to changing the mechanisms of his management of power.

From the security to the military side, these transformations have created additional challenges for the group. Apart from the reflection of the recent Israeli attack on Iran, which targeted missile and drone manufacturing facilities in Iranian cities, on the group’s military power, including Israel’s depletion of the resistance forces in a multi-front battle, the developments in the Israeli-Iranian conflict may mean activating an international green light to target the group, and then its strategy has adapted to these risks, by adopting an escalation path, represented by preparing for a potential war, starting with summoning its fighters and cadres of its military institutions and raising military readiness, and redeploying them to protect its sites from targeting, in exchange for preparing the societies it governs for a future round of war.

On the other hand, the group was prompted to move some battlefronts against its opponents to activate its internal front, and also to preempt any sudden military developments that may occur in the future. On the third hand, activating its position as a force in the resistance camp, albeit in a deliberate manner, and subject to the dynamics of the conflict with Israel, represented by resuming its operations against maritime navigation and carrying out attacks against ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, in addition to targeting Israel, and then confirming its continued support for the resistance, and also supporting its Iranian ally, in exchange for monitoring regional transformations, and moving in light of them.

The consequences of the Houthi group continuing to engage in support battles and alliance with Iran have imposed other challenges on it, represented by linking the Yemeni local condition with its complexities to the turbulent regional situation, which may move towards further escalation.

Although the continuation of the conflict situation meets the group’s orientations in waging wars with its allies to ensure consolidating its position in the local and regional equation, and also for political goals, represented in proving the continuation of the deteriorating economic situation in the areas under its control by the tax that it is a force in the resistance camp, the uncertainty of the current regional situation, as well as the contradiction of the interests of international and regional actors, may double the levels of risk by the group being dependent on the tensions of a multipolar conflict in which it does not constitute an active party, at the decision-making level, i.e. the continuation of escalation with Israel or the calm, not to mention its achievement of gains that improve its position as an authority.

In addition, the alliance between Iran and the Houthi group, in a sensitive regional context, has created burdens on the group, as it is subject not only to the consequences of Iran’s conflict with Israel, and also to supporting the resistance, but also, even if it does not want to, to the political priorities of its ally, in addition to being affected by the challenges that Iran faces, on the military, economic and political levels, as a result of its conflict with Israel, including the economic sanctions imposed on it by Israel’s allies, most notably the United States.

However, the arrangement of its relationship with its ally in Yemen, which was imposed, as it seems, by the risks resulting from targeting its weight in the region, leading to the continued depletion of human and military resources on the two most important fronts in the resistance arenas, namely the Lebanese and Palestinian fronts, made it re-export its ally in Yemen to the forefront, to relieve pressure on the other fronts, and also to consolidate the resistance camp, which is what Iranian policy towards the group reflects at the present time.

In addition to appointing an ambassador to the Yemeni capital Sana’a, months ago, which means that Iran is resuming its previous diplomacy in managing the Yemeni crisis, i.e. towards an escalation path that proves the continuation of the state of war, by recognizing the authority of the group, in exchange for not recognizing the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia’s allies, with the escalation of its conflict with Israel, Iran has transferred its political weight to Sana’a as its own regional area of influence, as the Iranian ambassador threatened to continue the battles supporting the resistance fronts in Lebanon and Gaza from Yemen, and to emphasize the group’s position in the equation of deterring Israel and its allies, in addition to Iran regaining its position as an active regional party in managing the Yemeni file, and a representative of the group, by activating diplomatic channels to reach an understanding with Saudi Arabia from the Omani mediator to holding indirect meetings.

Despite the importance of the group to Iran as a less expensive agent that gives it a greater degree of political investment and deterrent power against Israel, as well as its opponents and competitors in the region, managing this relationship is subject to Iranian priorities, and also to the policy that the next US administration will adopt towards it, in addition to the paths of its conflict with Israel in the future, and the regional and international circumstances that it will create, in addition to the arrangements for its relationship with Saudi Arabia, the main party in the Yemen war, and its results. Although the group remains a winning card for Iran to pressure and threaten, that does not mean that it will reap gains arising from that as an agent, let alone protect it from punishment if the international community wants to target the group.

*Quoted from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed