How could the killing of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi affect the Houthis and Iran?

On September 29, rumors began circulating on social media that a helicopter carrying leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Yemen-based Houthis had crashed in southwestern Iran.

According to reports, the incident resulted in the deaths of several senior members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Houthi leaders, including Houthi coordination chief Mohammed Abdul Salam and Houthi commander Abdul Malik al-Houthi.

But analysts quickly debunked the claims, noting that Iranian state media had not reported anything to suggest the rumors were true. Al-Houthi later proved he was alive and well when the leader delivered a video speech on the anniversary of October 7, 2023, the date of Hamas’s attack on Israel.

While al-Houthi is still alive today, his death in the near term would impact the group’s ability to operate and widen the leadership vacuum within the Iranian resistance axis.

After his rise to the Houthis’ military leader in 2004 and the death of his brother Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, al-Houthi made himself indispensable to the rebels. His vitality was enhanced in 2010 when he replaced his father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, as the group’s religious and political leader.

Since taking full control of the organization, the Houthis have successfully transformed what was once a “scattered militia” into a military organization that controls a large part of Yemeni territory and is capable of threatening regional powers and disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Gulf of Aden.

Since the Houthi attacks began last year, traffic through the Suez Canal has reportedly fallen by 66 percent. Despite this decline and evidence of Washington’s waning influence, Chinese ships have increased their transit of the strategic waterway, due to their preference for Iran and the Houthis.

Exploiting the security vacuum left by the United States in the region, the Houthis have proven their utility to their backers in Tehran by launching unprecedented attacks on Israeli territory and international shipping while simultaneously withstanding airstrikes from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel.

In September, the Houthis fired a surface-to-surface ballistic missile that traveled more than 1,200 miles to Tel Aviv, and several U.S. Navy destroyers were subjected to a “complex attack” by cruise missiles and drones in the Red Sea.

These efforts have greatly elevated the international community's standing, giving it leverage ahead of peace negotiations with Saudi Arabia and positioning it to assume a more central role in the IRGC's revolutionary strategies.

The critical role the Houthis continue to play in Yemen and within Iran’s network of allies and proxies could make them a target for Israel, a fear that is sure to increase in light of the recent killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

But whatever the immediate cause of al-Houthi’s death, his passing will not mean a quick end to the Houthis entirely: it will instead usher in a period of uncertainty for the organization that may require them to shift their focus away from operations outside Yemen’s borders.

If the next Houthi leader fails to live up to his predecessor, it could lead to a loss of morale and support from Houthi fighters, as well as the estimated two-thirds of Yemen’s population who live under the group’s control.

With a total population of over 32 million people, most of whom are in need of humanitarian assistance, the ability to successfully govern the local population remains weak but essential to maintaining power.

Given that Houthi’s charisma and his full leadership within the group have led to the Houthis’ rapid rise on the world stage, replacing him will be difficult. While his younger brother, Abdulkhaliq al-Houthi, seems the most logical replacement, given that he already serves as the Houthis’ deputy and has commanded the largest Houthi military brigade since the group took control of Sanaa in 2014, he has not been publicly named as a successor.

This ambiguity means he may face a challenge from other family members, such as his cousins Ali Hussein al-Houthi and Mohammed Ali Abdul Karim Amir al-Din al-Houthi or his older half-brother Yahya Badr al-Din al-Houthi.

But the internal conflict may extend beyond the Houthi family. While rarely discussed publicly, infighting between local Houthi leaders and loyalists from northern provinces has long been an issue for the rebels.

Although the Houthi leadership structure is characterized by family favoritism, the warring parties may see Houthi’s death as an opportunity to create a rival faction or oust his successor and perhaps change the group’s relationship with Iran or its focus of operations.

Despite Iran’s decade-long support for him with weapons and intelligence, the relationship between Sanaa and Tehran is complex and by no means as durable as Iran’s relationship with its other regional proxies in Lebanon or Iraq. The loss of the commander would be a blow to Iran, at least initially.

The Houthis, who have long been concerned for his safety, are well aware that their leader is a prime target for their enemies. In 2009, several years before the group seized control of the Yemeni capital and sparked international intervention, Yemeni media falsely reported that Houthi had been killed in an airstrike.

Since then, al-Houthi has been living in temporary hiding to avoid being tracked, never meeting the media and rarely seen in public. Iran is also aware of the threat, with social media reports shortly after Nasrallah’s death claiming that al-Houthi, along with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had been moved to safe locations to avoid Israeli attacks.

Recognizing that recent high-profile Israeli intelligence operations, such as attacks on communications in Lebanon and the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil, have instilled fear in the group’s ranks will only halt the group’s malign activities in the short term. Longer-term solutions, such as preventing Iran from resupplying the militant group and equipping the internationally recognized government, are essential to addressing the Houthi threat in the region and beyond.

• Source: Atlantic Council - By Emily Milliken and Caitlin Miller Hollingsworth