Military and diplomatic action are powerless.. What are Washington’s alternatives to confront the Houthi threat?

What should any country do when military and diplomatic action are unable to achieve any results? This is the situation the United States finds itself in today: Military escalation will not force the Houthis to stop their campaign against ships or their attacks on Israel. Diplomacy will not force them to do so either – at least not yet.

According to an analysis of the American military websitewaronetherocks - translated by “Yemen Shabab Net,” “intensifying the use of force would strengthen the regional legitimacy of the Houthis and their control over Yemen, while at the same time dragging the United States into a conflict that it cannot win, making it difficult to limit losses.” When the time comes".

He continued, "The use of force in Yemen encourages Israel to deepen its involvement, creating a negative vicious circle in which the United States becomes more involved. These risks go beyond the importance of the Red Sea to American interests."

The American analysis pointed out, "The Houthi challenge will eventually diminish, and the Gaza war will calm down, enabling the Houthis to declare victory. In the meantime, Washington should pave the way for a diplomatic process that guarantees a ceasefire on the part of the Houthis and reduces the chances of repeating the same scenario." .

China's mediation

The analysis said that this - i.e. a ceasefire from the Houthis - will require Iranian and Russian cooperation, as their support for the Houthis, and any influence they may gain through it, constitutes a guarantee of their basic interests. They may respond to a direct approach from Washington (as the United States did in dealing with Iran), and Masoud Pezeshkian assuming the presidency in Iran may provide another opportunity. But the main mediator, if there is one, will be China.

Given the risks posed by the Red Sea crisis, this issue should be a priority in US talks with China. Of course, the bilateral agenda is already overloaded, and neither country may be able to address this issue. China's interests will be divided, hindering its ability to make any difficult decisions about this situation. But for Washington, the risks are high – avoiding the trap in which Yemen turns into a hotel you can stay in but can't leave.

American interests in the Red Sea are clear: ensuring the security of this special shipping route, which occupies an important place in global trade. In practical terms, this means suppressing the Houthi threat to ships transiting Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea. Until now, the American approach to dealing with these goals has been primarily defensive, focusing on the cost in proportion to the size of the interest.

Attack on the Houthis

But pressure is growing in Washington to shift to the offensive against the Houthis. Patience runs out with an approach that does not produce the expected results. But coercion is the hardest trick to pull off in international relations, especially when the cost to the actor trying to coerce the party is greater than the cost to the targeted party. One can understand the frustrations of policymakers.

When the United States is very powerful - its economy is $27 trillion, its defense budget is $850 billion, its population is 330 million, and it occupies a large part of an entire continent with enormous resources - while its opponent is very weak - and its GDP is $22 billion... As a large portion of the population faces starvation, this discomfort could turn into something worse.

This kind of cumulative frustration transformed the US policy of “keeping Saddam Hussein in the box” into regime change and all that followed, but to be sure, such dissatisfaction tends to ignore the fact that these primitive associations do not take into account the will The Houthis' political policies, their control of the lands, and their clear fate.

There are also constant preoccupations. The first is the belief that failure to attack indicates weakness and invites further aggression. Concern about credibility accompanies this. After declaring American interests and the forces committed to achieving them, we need to show results. If we do not, adversaries will scoff at future commitments to military force.

At the strategic level, global deterrence requires responding to Russian and Iranian reliance on horizontal escalation, and if these competitors get a free pass, they will escalate elsewhere as well. Then there are practical maritime issues. Given the US Navy's global responsibilities, keeping the carrier strike group trapped in the Red Sea is unwise and punishes crews and equipment. The fact that the Houthis have refused to negotiate with what the United States considers good faith fuels the momentum of escalation. The United States and the United Nations tried diplomacy, but it did not work. It's time to take the gloves off, right?

Escalation options

The usual menu of escalation options includes launching attacks against Yemen's limited infrastructure such as Israel's bombing of the port of Hodeidah, factories and warehouses linked to Houthi missile and drone stockpiles, military bases, and senior Houthi officials. No one is talking about sending ground forces. But there is no doubt about the United States' ability to harm the Houthis.

not necessarily. In terms of direct cost to the US economy, despite Houthi provocations, US GDP is rising, inflation is slowing, credit markets are thriving, and the stock market is rising. The cost of fleet operations is significant, about $1 billion, but it is ridiculous compared to the administration's overall defense budget request for 2025.

As for opportunity costs, the advantage of the Navy lies in its superior mobility. If tensions over Taiwan suddenly escalate, or Russia attacks cargo ships carrying military aid to Ukraine, the strike group may be able to exit the Red Sea through Bab al-Mandab toward the Pacific Ocean, or through the Suez Canal toward the Atlantic Ocean, very quickly.

It is true that the “cost/exchange ratio” — the difference between the cost of the missiles the Navy uses to shoot down Houthi weapons and the cost of those weapons — is inappropriate for the United States, but the Department of Defense is working to fix this imbalance.

The current policy enables the United States to credibly claim that it is carrying out its responsibility to secure maritime trade routes and deny the Houthis military superiority in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. These factors alone meet US strategic objectives in the Red Sea.

But the American position up to this point has a number of additional advantages. It demonstrates the significant defensive capability of US fleet assets against potential adversaries, while avoiding the trap of escalation - the costs of which may outweigh the interest at stake.

The American defensive posture also mainly helps Israel's defense. These things were done without feeding the Houthis' justifications for waging war and continuing to oppress Yemenis under their control. This, in turn, preserved room for negotiation if the current stalemate eased. The current approach also serves as a hedging ploy because it allows the United States to focus on more pressing challenges at the same time.

In short, the American approach avoids starting a battle that it cannot end given the Houthis’ natural advantages, their relative immunity to air attacks, and their tight control over their political destiny.

For this approach to continue, it is necessary for the United States to persuade Israel to maintain a defensive posture in the face of further Houthi provocations and not carry out renewed retaliatory attacks. The priority for the United States should be to reassure the Israeli government that the United States will continue to integrate its regional air defenses with Israeli defenses to deny the Houthis the possibility of launching any further successful attacks against the Israelis. Washington may be doing just that now.

Commitments acquired carelessly can be very difficult to let go of. There was a period when this was not necessarily the case. In 1982, the Reagan administration committed to sending American forces to stabilize Lebanon. When it took sides in a civil war it intended to defuse, American troops and diplomats came under fierce attack.

After hundreds of Americans died and the American attempt to subdue its executioners through massive firepower failed, President Ronald Reagan simply withdrew. No American administration in this era can abandon the kind of formal and trivial commitment that Reagan made in Lebanon. The presence of US troops in Afghanistan for 20 years, 19 years after completing their mission, is the contemporary counterexample – hence this warning to policymakers who tend to make such a commitment when headwinds are blowing strong.

So what should the United States do?

Instead of military escalation, the administration's first instinct may be to double down on sanctions. But sanctions almost always strengthen authoritarian actors while punishing ordinary people. So this is not a great idea, especially when Yemen is already suffering from a humanitarian catastrophe. Therefore, the first step should be to continue pressing for a ceasefire in Gaza.

At this stage, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu do not appear quite ready to reach an agreement, but Secretary of State Tony Blinken says the two sides are a short distance away, and if so, the Houthis' intentions will at least become clear.

The second step, working with the United Nations, is to establish a contact group consisting of representatives of the Houthis, Saudis, Emiratis, Palestinian Authority, China, Russia, the European Union and others involved in Operation Prosperity Guardian. Alison Minor, former deputy envoy to Yemen, makes a strong case for this kind of diplomatic approach based on her impression of the dynamics in the UN Security Council.

The task of the larger contact group is to keep the Houthi leadership focused on resolving the conflict from which it clearly benefits. Although the Houthis have so far rejected Saudi incentives, a larger contact group may be able to improve the situation.

Separately, Washington should cooperate with Beijing and Moscow directly or through intermediaries to pressure them to persuade Iran and the Houthi leadership to de-escalate, more specifically define their requirements for a ceasefire in the Red Sea, and set the rules of the road for the future.

In conjunction with these steps, the United States will need to continue urging Israel to maintain its composure, focus on defensive measures, and of course agree to a ceasefire in Gaza. None of these steps will work miracles under unpromising circumstances, but they are better than the alternative.

Returning to the issue of American interests, the facts indicate that the best way to preserve these interests is to maintain the current American position, which enjoys multilateral support and avoids escalation that prevents an exit strategy even while strengthening a determined enemy.