"It must be used alongside other tools." American Institute: What is the impact of naval power in the confrontation with the Houthis?

In November 2023, the Houthis began attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The attacks continue despite the United States and other countries deploying naval forces to protect trade in the region. In fact, the risks to commercial shipping in the Red Sea have increased, as evidenced by the rise in insurance rates during the first half of September.

The Houthis are clearly inferior in combat capabilities. Yet naval forces operating in the region have failed to stop their attacks. This is true even though the United States has struck the Houthis on multiple occasions with a combination of air power and naval missile strikes.

This has raised questions about the U.S. response and, more broadly, the utility of naval power. Headlines proclaim that “Houthis defeated the U.S. Navy” and “They now rule the Red Sea,” while a Wall Street Journal editorial board op-ed asserts that “the U.S.-led coalition to escort ships can now be declared a failure.”

Such statements may lead readers to complain about the ineffectiveness of naval power. But before reaching such a conclusion, let us consider the writings of Alfred T. Mahan, written more than a century ago. His arguments give a more complete picture of the role of naval power in the confrontation with the Houthis. They also speak more broadly about the role of naval power in the twenty-first century.

Naval power and confrontation with the Houthis

Mahan wrote that sea power combines naval and economic elements. The combination of economic and naval power often works quietly, away from the prying eyes of shore, to get results.

Mahan noted that the impact of naval power is easy to miss because it is almost impossible to see in action. Even in 2024, the world seems to notice only when the Houthis hit a ship, shoot down a U.S. drone, or try to escalate the conflict.

This should come as no surprise. A navy is not a silver bullet that will quickly end a crisis. Rather, a single-handed naval force works to quietly bleed adversaries. Historically, it has done this by regulating maritime trade to achieve economic leverage. This means protecting friendly trade and limiting commercial interactions between adversaries.

In recent decades, the increased range and accuracy of weapons, including ship-launched missiles and those used in carrier-launched airstrikes, have added another layer to the U.S. Navy's options when operating alone.

But precision strikes on targets ashore generally do not achieve quick and lasting results. Using naval power to directly influence situations ashore has historically proven difficult, and this remains true in the Red Sea.

Naval power and strategies of attrition

Julian S. Corbett, a contemporary of Mahan's, warned that the effects of naval power "must always be so slow, and so annoying both to our commercial community and to neutrals, that the tendency is always in favor of accepting terms of peace which are far from decisive." Naval campaigns based on exhaustion are protracted affairs that often produce less than ideal results.

Operations in the Red Sea carry a high price tag. First, the search for alternative trade routes results in delays in transit. Ships willing to risk the Red Sea pay higher insurance costs to use the contested waters. In addition, consider the costs associated with the potential loss of a commercial vessel. These include the total value of the vessel, the loss of its carrying capacity, and the risks to commercial vessels.

There are also environmental considerations: an oil spill was a major concern after the Greek-owned tanker MV Sunion was damaged off the coast of Yemen in August. Then there is the cost of maintaining warships in the region and the huge expenditure on weapons used to thwart Houthi attacks. Given the costs, there is likely to be strong pressure to end operations on some terms with the Houthis.

Preventing transit was more cost-effective than protecting trade. Take, for example, the Battle of the Atlantic—the longest continuous campaign in the European theater of World War II. The battle began in September 1939 and lasted until the end of hostilities in 1945.

It has been said that for much of the war, the Germans were able to divert more Allied resources to protect Allied trade than the Germans spent fighting the campaign. The Houthis gain similar advantages despite their great weakness as a fighting force.

Naval power as a necessary enabler

With the necessary political will, naval powers can continue their operations and keep trade routes open despite the costs, thus buying time for diplomatic and military options to achieve more sustainable outcomes. We can turn again to Mahan for an explanation.

When he wrote more than a century ago about the influence of sea power, Mahan carefully studied the Napoleonic Wars and concluded that the decisive factor was the economic struggle between Britain and France. In fact, Mahan concluded his study of “The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire” in 1812, when Napoleon’s armies invaded Russia, not at Waterloo in 1815.

Mahan concluded that by 1812 British naval power had put Napoleon in a tight spot. The British fleet protected the British Isles and their colonies. Unable to defeat Britain by invasion, Napoleon established the Continental System to prevent Britain from trading with its largest trading partner—continental Europe. Mahan called the Continental System “the decisive factor in Napoleon’s fortunes.”

It caused enormous economic disruption. Attempts to force countries to join the Continental System led to military interventions, including operations in the Iberian Peninsula, which Napoleon was unable to achieve a satisfactory outcome. Later, attempts to keep Russia in the Continental System led Napoleon to war with that country in 1812.

Napoleon's aggressive actions stimulated the development of a coalition to oppose him. This was the key to his eventual defeat. Mahan makes it clear: Naval power multiplied Napoleon's opponents and forced him to take self-defeating measures. Naval power did its work slowly and quietly to set the stage for more dramatic results.

We need to think the same way about the Houthi threat today. Naval power allows states to buy time and create the conditions for future success. As the conflict drags on, leaders will need to think creatively about using naval power alongside other instruments of national power to put the Houthis in a position from which they cannot win. At the same time, they must be prepared to take advantage of favorable developments—including those that may arise outside the Red Sea.

Source: US Naval Institute - Translated by: Yemen Youth Net