Has Bashar al-Assad's regime abandoned Hezbollah in the current confrontation with the Israeli occupation?

She said that the current situation of the Syrian regime is more difficult and complex than before, stressing that "the next major rebellion will be more powerful and difficult" for the Syrian regime.

It seems that the Syrian regime has many calculations that make it hesitate a thousand times before engaging in any confrontation with "Israel", especially at this stage, and its history in dealing with the occupation reveals an aspect of this position.

Bashar al-Assad's position on the Al-Aqsa flood

Since October 9, 2023, Israel has been waging an ongoing war on the Gaza Strip, launching a military operation called “Iron Swords,” following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack carried out by Hamas and Palestinian factions on the 7th of the same month.

Meanwhile, the Syrian regime had avoided taking clear positions on the war and maintained political silence, while Israel did not stop expanding its strikes on Syrian territory and increased its pace after the outbreak of the Gaza war, as it rose from 6 to 11 strikes compared to the same period of time between 2022 and 2023.

The Syrian regime reacted lukewarmly to the war in Gaza; after Operation “Noah’s Flood,” it contented itself with issuing a statement in which it linked Operation “Noah’s Flood” to the October War, in an attempt to remind people of its achievements in confronting Israel, without departing from the diplomatic language and its scope of condemnation and denunciation.

After the war on Gaza began, the regime adopted a policy of political neglect; Bashar al-Assad has not made any media appearances since then, and the same applies to the Foreign Minister, who has only made a few timid statements and meetings since October 7.

On the media level, the regime was content to cover the war, focusing on the atrocities committed by Israel there, while completely ignoring the Hamas movement, which is absolutely at the forefront of the Palestinian political scene during the war.

On the domestic level, the regime has worked since the beginning of the war to impose strict security control over the Palestinian camps to prevent demonstrations rejecting the war. Syrian cities have not witnessed any demonstrations in support of the Palestinians, which the regime is accustomed to organizing on such occasions.

The regime refused to allow Hamas to resume its military activity in Syria, which had stopped since the end of 2011. The escalation of Iranian militias against Israel from the Syrian front remained very limited and did not deviate from the rules of engagement despite the escalation of the war in Gaza.

Rather, as the war entered its fourth month, these operations declined across the northern front. This can be attributed to the role of Russia, which resumed patrols near the border with the Golan since October 31, 2023, and then deployed two new points in the Golan to monitor the ceasefire between the regime and Israel.

Bashar's position on Israel

In the 2023 Gaza War, the regime did not show a political or military stance towards Israel, and unlike 2006, it is actually unable to direct any military threat to it. Its forces, after 12 years of conflict, suffer from a severe shortage of equipment and manpower, and many of its military units have been transformed into places for collecting destroyed equipment, or headquarters and warehouses for Iranian militias.

In fact, the regime lost to Iran one of the most prominent tools of power that it was marketing regionally and internationally, which is influencing the military and security decisions of the Palestinian factions from the Syrian front, similar to what happened to it after its forces left Lebanon in 2005, which weakened its ability to influence Hezbollah at the expense of Iran.

Bashar's position on Hezbollah

The Syrian regime did not show any position even regarding the most exciting operations targeting Hezbollah forces (the operation to blow up the "Major" devices or the killing of the leader Ibrahim Aqil, and before that the killing of many leading figures in Hezbollah). According to what was published by France Press, Bashar al-Assad's silence is due to Russian pressure on this point.

Russian President Vladimir Putin fears that the Syrian geography will turn into a battlefield, which, if that happens, will lead to a confusion of cards that could undermine Russian interests in Syria.

Even if there is talk about the possibility of the Golan front igniting, this will not be through Hezbollah or the forces of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, but rather through the Iraqi and Iranian militias.

In contrast, Bashar al-Assad did not announce his support for Hezbollah in confronting the Israeli occupation, and was content with issuing a statement of condolence after the assassination of the Secretary-General of the Lebanese party, Hassan Nasrallah.

repositioning

Syrian political analyst Mahmoud Othman discussed in his discussion with "Arabi Post" the Iranian repositioning in Syria, which naturally includes the relationship with Bashar al-Assad as well as Hezbollah. He said that international players have instructed Iran that they will not surrender to the reality inside Syria in this way and that they will change the balance of power in Syria, which explains Bashar al-Assad's "lackluster" position on the Israeli war on Lebanon, according to the Syrian analyst.

He also said that Bashar al-Assad is playing on the balance in his relations with both Russia and Iran. He does not want to lose Russia or Iran, but at the same time he has no choice but to submit to Russian pressure, which includes the need to stay away from supporting Hezbollah and Iran so that he does not face a real crisis with the occupation, especially since Russia is playing the role of mediator in this area, as it seeks to ensure that Assad remains away from the ongoing war in exchange for ensuring that the Israeli occupation does not put pressure on Bashar al-Assad or target the Syrian depth with force, which would affect Bashar’s political future in Syria in the coming period.

Othman also says that there is naturally coordination between the party inside Syria and Iran, as well as an understanding with Iran not to indulge in supporting the party during its war against the entity, and Iran is aware of this and understands it and is not putting pressure on Bashar al-Assad because it is aware of the extent of Russian pressure in this area.

He also said in his statements to "Arabi Post" that the international party represented by the United States of America and behind it Israel wants to empty the Syrian interior of Hezbollah in Syria by all means, but at the same time, with a certain presence remaining inside Syria for the party but within the framework of a specific path subject to its control and oversight to a large extent.

But Othman says in his interview with "Arabi Post" that the Syrian regime is in strong need of Hezbollah in Syria, as the party is the one that supported it, preserved its existence, and prevented its downfall from the Syrian revolution. But of course, Russia and many parties want the party's presence in Syria to be different from what it was before.

Researcher at the Omran Center, Maan Talaa, monitors another path in his analysis of the nature of the relationship between Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad in his interview with “Arabi Post”, as he said that the relationship developed from mere support - then a training phase for Bashar al-Assad’s forces - to end with a phase of military deployment of the party and its forces in Syria for many years.

At the same time, he pointed out that Hezbollah forces had become a major part of the ground operations room of Bashar al-Assad's forces in Syria, which was responsible for suppressing the Syrian revolution and targeting the Syrian people.

He also pointed out that Hezbollah initially sent its members into Syria and then established centers to recruit Syrians and foreign fighters coming from the West, as well as from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and other countries, bringing the number of Hezbollah forces in Syria to more than fifty thousand, according to estimates by Syrian researcher Maan Talaa.

He also says that the killing of Qassem Soleimani by US forces in Iraq in January 2020 caused Hezbollah to increase its activity inside Syrian territory, with a green light from the Iranian side, which was drawing all the paths on which Hezbollah would move inside Syria.

As for what was raised about Israeli threats to Bashar al-Assad not to engage in the ongoing war with Hezbollah so that he would not face clear threats from the Israeli occupation, Maan Talaa said that these messages are not a threat in the clear sense to Bashar al-Assad, but rather come in the context of sending messages to Hezbollah and to Iran through Bashar al-Assad that there is no longer any room for any role for Iran or the party in Syria in the coming period.

He also said that Bashar al-Assad is trying to maneuver in his relations between Russia and Iran, and at the same time stressed that Hezbollah now has no less than 150 military bases and military strongholds inside Syrian territory.

How did Hezbollah's presence in Syria become "realistic"?

In fact, Hezbollah's military operations inside Syrian territory began in May 2013 when the party launched an attack alongside Syrian regime forces to regain control of the strategic town of Qusayr. The result was that Hezbollah's Secretary-General at the time, Hassan Nasrallah, officially announced his participation in the conflict in Syria after taking control of Qusayr in May 2013.

Then, in June 2013, Hezbollah began transferring its fighters to the city of Aleppo to participate in combat operations alongside the Syrian regime. The result was the deployment of Hezbollah forces in several locations north and south of Aleppo.

Also, in February 2014, Hezbollah participated in the battle to control the city of Yabroud, and the result was the Syrian regime’s control of the city of Yabroud in March 2014.

In addition, in January 2015, an Israeli aircraft targeted a car carrying a group affiliated with Hezbollah in Mazraat al-Amal in Quneitra, killing seven Hezbollah members, including the leader Jihad Imad Mughniyeh.

In December 2015, the party participated in the first battle of Khan Touman, and in February 2016, Hezbollah participated in the battle to lift the siege on the towns of Nubl and Zahraa in the Aleppo countryside. The Syrian regime forces and Hezbollah forces lifted the siege on the towns of Nubl and Zahraa years later.

In May 2016, a plane believed to be Israeli targeted a Hezbollah military site near Damascus International Airport, resulting in the death of Hezbollah leader Mustafa Badreddine, one of the accused in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Also, in March 2017, an Israeli aircraft targeted a joint military site of the Syrian regime and Hezbollah near the city of Palmyra, resulting in the destruction of weapons shipments that were heading to Hezbollah sites in Lebanon.

Also, in October 2017, Hezbollah participated in the battle to control the city of Albukamal, and the result was the Syrian regime’s control of the city of Albukamal in November 2017.

In January 2020, Hezbollah participated in the battle to control the Khan Touman area, and the result was the Syrian regime’s control of Khan Touman in January of the same year.

Number of Hezbollah military bases in Syria

Given Maan Talaa’s statements about Hezbollah’s military presence in Syria, what are the areas where the party is stationed? According to some open sources, we found that Hezbollah’s military presence in Syrian territory is distributed as follows:

• Aleppo Governorate: There are 38 Hezbollah military bases in Aleppo Governorate, some of which are independent or shared with Iranian forces.
• Idlib Governorate: There are 13 Hezbollah military bases in Idlib, either independent or shared with Iranian forces.
• Homs Governorate: There are 15 Hezbollah military bases in Homs, some of which are independent or shared with Iranian forces.
• Damascus and its countryside: There are 14 Hezbollah military bases in Damascus and its countryside, some of which are independent or shared with Iranian forces.
• Daraa Governorate: There are 22 Hezbollah military bases in Daraa Governorate, some of which are independent or shared with Iranian forces.
• Deir Ezzor Governorate: There are 7 Hezbollah military bases in Deir Ezzor Governorate, some of which are independent or shared with Iranian forces.
• Quneitra Governorate: There are 6 Hezbollah military bases in Quneitra Governorate, some of which are independent or shared with Iranian forces.
• Sweida Governorate: There are 3 Hezbollah military bases in Sweida Governorate, some of which are independent or shared with Iranian forces.
• Hama Governorate: There are 4 Hezbollah military bases in Hama Governorate, some of which are independent or shared with Iranian forces.

The beginning of the crisis

On April 26, 2024, Agence France-Presse quoted what it said were experts as saying that the Syrian regime had avoided involvement in the Gaza war, despite the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which was blamed on Israel and threatened to ignite a regional conflagration.

Agence France-Presse reported that Bashar al-Assad's government is seeking to achieve a delicate balance between Russia and Iran, which supported it during the 13-year war and helped it regain lost territory.

The agency quoted a Western diplomat who requested anonymity as saying: "The Israelis clearly warned Assad that if Syria was used against them, they would destroy his regime."

A source close to the Lebanese Hezbollah said that the attacks on Iranian sites in Syria prompted Tehran to reduce its military presence throughout southern Syria, especially in areas adjacent to the Golan.

On April 17, 2024, the American newspaper, The Wall Street Journal, revealed that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had begun evacuating its bases and evacuating its leaders from Syria, in anticipation of a response to an attack launched by Iran on Israel.

The newspaper quoted unnamed Syrian and Iranian advisers as saying that the Revolutionary Guards and the Lebanese Hezbollah had reduced the presence of their senior officers in Syria and transferred mid-ranking officers from their original positions in Syria.

divergence of views

According to a report published by the "Syria TV" website, the past few days have witnessed political and field differences between Hezbollah and the Iranians on the one hand, and the Syrian regime and Russia behind it on the other hand.

The source believes that the political atmosphere between Hezbollah and the regime’s officials reflects Assad’s bias in the foreseeable future towards Russian options more than Iranian ones. The diplomatic source believes that Moscow is well aware of the level of Iranian influence within the Syrian regime, so it is trying to rehabilitate Assad in a new guise on the regional and international levels in light of the normalization of Saudi-Emirati relations with him in the last two years.

Previous security meetings between Russia and Hezbollah

In a parallel context, a Russian security delegation held meetings with the Lebanese Hezbollah in August 2024. The aim of the meeting was to test the party’s pulse and find out its future steps, according to a report published by the “Syria TV” website. At the same time, the report stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin had tasked National Security Council member Sergei Shoigu with making contacts with the Iranian side and the Syrian regime, with the aim of emphasizing the neutrality of Syrian territory from escalation. This is the reason for Shoigu’s visit to Tehran a few days ago.

The Russian envoy to Tehran expressed to the latter his fears that slipping into an open war whose sparks would reach Syria could bring about the wrath of Washington and Israel against the Syrian regime, which would increase the possibility of the latter being targeted, and not just responding to Iran’s activity in Syria.

Also, within the framework of Russian efforts to neutralize Syria from the widening conflict between Iran and Israel, Putin was keen to give advice to Bashar al-Assad, after he brought him to Moscow in late July 2024.

Source: Arabi Post