All this Iranian rationality

Since Iran entered the turmoil of the Arab world after the events of 2011, one of the questions that concerns us, the Arabs, has become: How does the Islamic Republic of Iran think about foreign affairs? ... At the beginning and end of the matter, Iran acts as a nation-state; that is, a state whose interests and risks determine its policies, and the main function of its regime is to preserve itself, like any other political regime. Since Khomeini's dealings with Israel and the United States, as appeared in the Iran-Contra scandal (the sale of American weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of American detainees in 1985), and the important Iranian services to the Americans in the invasion of Afghanistan, and its cooperation with them in Iraq, it has been clear that the Iranian regime has mastered the path of pragmatism and the limits of the relationship between its discourse and its behavior. ... Why then does Iran's position on the genocide in Gaza seem less than expected, and perhaps even a failure despite knowing all this? Then countries support armed struggle movements because they cannot wage the conflict themselves. Why then is it expected that Iran or its arms, amidst the blood, corpses and tears, will get involved in the conflict themselves to save the Palestinian resistance and the Palestinian people, instead of raising the reproach called in their language support?

One reason, but not the most important, is that Iran’s bazaar-like political rationality is matched by an irrationality in official discourse that borders on hysteria. Phrases like “We will wipe Israel off the map” are beloved in Iranian discourse, and are not uttered by writers close to the regime or official newspapers, but by political leaders and senior military commanders in the Revolutionary Guard. This hysterical discourse has its benefits in cases of lack of direct contact with Israel; it mobilizes the regime’s social base and strengthens the psychosis of the incubators of Arab militias affiliated with or allied with Iran. We must remember that the discourse of the Arab populist regimes in the 1960s did not deteriorate to the Iranian level. However, one of the most miserable and long-lasting cases of rhetorical abuse and political shaming was formulated on the basis of its contradictions with the regime’s reality.

In any case, this same speech becomes a burden on its author when the clash approaches, as is currently happening to the Iranian regime, because everything that can be done realistically will not live up to the threat of the speech, not to mention that the signs of the clash reveal the truth about the military capabilities of the two parties (Israel, Iran and their allies), and that the most possible is not an Iranian option in the first place. And because contradiction is the material of all humor, cold Iranian rationality appears as a farce, but it seems that most farces in the world contain something tragic within them, and here we come to the second and most important reason.

Iran has inflicted catastrophes on the Arab East, and in human and historical terms we are talking about a civilizational demise: the destruction of human civilization, the disintegration of the social structure, and violent demographic shifts that would take decades or centuries to occur under “normal” circumstances. The Iranian regime did so with pure rationality and with the violence that usually suits it; that persistent violence that knows no limits. Iran acted in Syria and Iraq according to its simple principle: decisively engaging in battles to reap gains as long as this does not pose a threat to the existence of the regime. But this expansionist state principle is injected with sectarianism and ideologically tinged with the Palestinian cause. Hence, it is difficult for a sober person to avoid the comparison between Iran’s involvement in Syria “for the sake of the Palestinian cause,” and its exemplary restraint when the process of crushing the cause and exterminating its people takes place, and during which Iran itself is dealt embarrassing and painful blows. Even the fascists who are sincere in their belief in the principle of annihilating peoples, countries, everything and any value “for the sake of Palestine” now see that Iran and its sectarian Arab militias accept the crushing of Palestine itself if that will save Iran’s influence.

Many writers and politicians were aware of all this before the “Al-Aqsa Flood” day, but a less naive question than it seems comes to mind here: Was the resistance in Gaza aware of this as well? Contrary to popular belief, there are things that are clearer to observers of events than to their makers, because the former have the space to reflect and consider, and because, in a familiar paradox, they are ignorant of many details. To weigh the probabilities in answering the question, there is a connection to the October 7 event itself: Did the Palestinian resistance plan for the “Al-Aqsa Flood” to be of such a towering height, or did the operation achieve a military success that its owners did not imagine? If the former, then it is most likely that the resistance gambled that with this operation it would save the Palestinian cause from its slow death, opening the door for Iran (through Hezbollah) towards a war that would change the strategic balance in Palestine and the region. In the statement of the Chief of Staff of the Martyr Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Muhammad Deif, on the day of the launch of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, there was an explicit call for the axis of resistance to participate in the offensive from the first day. This means that the resistance did not fully understand the strength of the rationality of the Iranian state and its militias, and the actual weight of the Palestinian cause in its strategy. If it was the latter, then the resistance, after what happened, had no choice but to hope for the escalation of the contradiction between Iran and Israel to a point that would push the Iranians to incite Hezbollah to enter the war.

In the second possibility, the resistance understood Israel's priorities well, and its hope of regionalizing the war almost came true more than once, but Iranian prudence and the American position prevented that. In that same hope, there is a misunderstanding of Iran's position in the world; Iran, while maneuvering against the United States and Israel, is not fighting imperialism or Zionism, but rather it is a state looking for a place in the club of the powerful, and its regime and urban middle class wish to have a seat next to Westerners, not Russia and China. It will not be embarrassed by its allies' demands for public support, if that threatens its influence, and it will not be driven out of its prudence by Israel's insult to its security and sovereignty. This is in addition to the American refusal to allow Israel to attack and strike Iran. Iran's contradiction with Israel is real and deep, but, in the end, it is a contradiction of influence, not a contradiction of existence, such that Iran can be dragged or even convinced to drag its arms, in which it has long invested, into a client war that threatens the regime's existence or influence by amputating its arms.

If the Palestinian resistance survives this war, it will face challenges regarding how to deal with Iran and its limited and politically and morally costly support, which cannot lead to reasonable results for the Palestinian cause. The Iranian regime will review its mechanisms of action with the Palestinian resistance after it frightened it and almost dragged it into a destructive war with its unilateral move on October 7. As for Israel, led by Netanyahu, it seeks to seize the opportunity to settle all accounts at once: desertifying Gaza, reoccupying the West Bank, striking Hezbollah, and destroying the Iranian nuclear program. Although Israel’s regional aspirations do not receive a US response, Iran’s restrained behavior may tempt Israel to insist on the United States if Trump returns to power; because Iran will not wage a war that threatens the existence of its regime, unless the war aims to overthrow the regime. Therefore, it is possible to imagine a final Iranian act of wisdom: that the regime will absorb a fatal blow to its nuclear project, as Iraq did in the 1980s, if it realizes that waging a war in response to that means its demise.

(New Arab)