Trump or Harris.. What is the likely strategy that the next US administration will adopt towards the Houthi militias in Yemen? (Analysis)

On January 20, 2025, either Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump will be inaugurated as president of the United States. Whoever takes the oath that day will face a host of national security challenges, from the war in Ukraine and China’s growing aggression to the conflict between Israel and Hamas, Iran, and growing threats.

The Houthis, the Iranian-backed militia that controls northern Yemen and has been attacking commercial shipping in and around the Red Sea for the past year, will also be at the top of the list.

According to the Congressional Research Service, the Houthis have carried out about 160 attacks on commercial and naval vessels, resulting in a more than 50 percent drop in ships transiting the Red Sea and a nearly 50 percent increase in insurance rates for ships that continue to pass through the Suez Canal. Container ships that avoid the Red Sea are forced to travel around the Horn of Africa, adding time, distance, and cost. All of these additional costs—in time and money—are slowly passed on to consumers.

The administration of President Joseph Biden Jr. has responded with a strategy of defense, deterrence, and degradation. First, the United States wants to defend commercial and naval shipping in the Red Sea. In practice, the United States and its allies have been largely successful, with the Houthis sinking only two ships, though they have damaged several others. But the frequency of Houthi attacks has contributed to commercial concerns about using the Red Sea.

The second prong of the Biden administration’s strategy, deterring the Houthis from carrying out future attacks, has failed. This is because the Houthis want this conflict with the United States for their own domestic political reasons. Similarly, the United States, despite multiple airstrikes, has been unable to degrade the Houthis to the point where they are unable to carry out future attacks.

The next administration—whether Harris or Trump—will need to chart a new course to overcome the shortcomings of the current U.S. approach.

Harris approach

A future Harris administration is likely to try to implement what might be called “Biden Plus.” Initially, a Harris administration is likely to try to solve the Houthi problem by dealing with what it believes is the root cause: the war between Israel and Hamas.

As a result, Harris will try to broker a ceasefire as a first step toward a peace deal. However, like the Biden administration, the Harris administration will soon find that it does not have as much influence with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as it assumed.

If the Harris administration is unable to end the cycle of violence between Israel and Hamas, it will need to answer what to do with the Houthis. This will likely lead to a two-step approach.

First, the United States will try to close off the smuggling routes that bring Iranian weapons into Yemen. Second, the new administration will find itself backed into a corner as the Houthis continue to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea, and will feel compelled to respond more forcefully.

This would lead to a slow but gradual easing of restrictions on targeting in Yemen. Instead of just defensive strikes or hitting Houthi missiles or weapons depots, the United States would likely find itself targeting a growing list of Houthi targets in an attempt to end the group’s attacks.

Unfortunately, none of these steps is likely to achieve the ultimate outcome the United States wants in Yemen: an end to Houthi strikes in the Red Sea. First, Iran’s smuggling routes are well established and diverse enough that the United States would have difficulty making a significant dent in the flow of weapons to Yemen, let alone the large number of weapons the Houthis already possess.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Houthis want escalation with the United States. The group is betting that it can withstand greater punishment than the United States is willing to impose.

Just as the group built its local base through years of Saudi and Emirati airstrikes, the Houthis believe two things: Air power alone cannot defeat them, and the more strikes on Houthi targets, the stronger their local support base will become.

Trump's approach

On January 19, 2021, Trump’s last full day in office, his administration designated the Houthis as a “foreign terrorist organization.” The move, intended to tighten the screws on the incoming Biden administration, was part of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. After a month-long review, the Biden administration removed the Houthis from the terrorism list in an effort to end the fighting in Yemen.

Regardless of who wins the presidency in November, the United States will need a strategy that allows it to protect free and open trade in the Red Sea without becoming embroiled in an open conflict in Yemen. Yet defining the ultimate goals of such a strategy is much easier than determining the means to achieve them.

* Analysis by Gregory D. Johnsen is a nonresident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, a former member of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, and the author of The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, and America’s War in the Arabian Peninsula. He is currently the associate director of the Institute for Future Conflict at the US Air Force Academy.