Nakf: The tribal customary weapon that is being fought over by the warring parties in Yemen

Maragha reference Muhammad bin Ali Sayyad, head of the "Tribal Customs Council", says that these tribal customs have been inherited from the ancestors of all Yemeni tribes and were agreed upon and unanimously approved by the sheikhs and Maraghs of all tribes and were approved by the scholars and rulers of the country in the year 1837 corresponding to 1253 AH. The reference customs consist of 222 rules formulated as texts that adhere to poetic meter without rhyme.

Among these customs, Rule No. 193 grants foreigners who come or work in the tribe’s “land” immunity from protection, and whoever attacks them commits a “red fault.” What is meant by this are crimes of honor, money, and blood, the punishment for which is the “al-Muhadhdash” ruling, which is to increase the penalty eleven times the basic penalty. Those covered by protection are seven, as stated in the text of the article:

The wise and generous

And in the era of the Master of the Order

Like a sect in the flood

Systematic or jurisprudent of the tablet

Nor his trumpet on my conscience

I don't intend the craft

The intended description of “the wise man of the disease” is the physician, “the one under the rule of the ruler” is the one who enters the country with the permission of the ruler, “the sectarian” is the one who is charged by the state with work such as collecting taxes, zakat, and the like, “the regular” is the state soldier and the one who falls under his rule, and that was his name in the past, “the jurist of the tablet” is the teacher and the one who falls under his rule, “the dhimmi” is the Jew or Christian, and “the one who intends the profession” is the investor or seller and the like.

Customs are divided into five chapters whose contents resemble the laws of formal litigation. They include issues that fall under what can be classified today as civil rights, original penalties for crimes, the law of subsidiary penalties, the law of urgent cases, the law of pleadings and executive procedures, the law of evidence, and the law of control and its operating expenses. This is what Al-Maragha Sayyad mentioned in his book “The Document of Customary Reference Rules for All Yemeni Tribes.”

Tribesmen passed on these customs among themselves spontaneously and by imitation and following in the footsteps of social upbringing institutions such as the family and the tribe, “as they are governing and effective social frameworks in society, and following them is part of the condition for the individual’s integration into the group and recognition of him,” as the writer and researcher Ahmed Al-Tars Al-Arami states.

Nakf is one of these tribal customs. It has other less common names, including al-Yawm al-Kabir and al-Muqdam. It is also called al-Matareh in Marib. It is called by members of the same tribe or allied tribes, who gather in an agreed-upon place. It is called for various purposes, such as supporting the oppressed, or against the backdrop of social issues including honor and shame disputes, or other issues such as the threat of invasion. Those gathered in the specified place discuss the appropriate decision to take, which may reach the point of declaring war. When an invasion or attack by a tribe or any other force is attempted, the targeted tribe sends warnings to the targeted party before declaring Nakf.

If it does not respond, it is resorted to in what resembles a declaration of general mobilization for war for the state. Dr. Muhammad Al Dhaheri states that the similarity between the tribe and the state is evident in several examples he mentioned in his article published in the “Ufak” journal.

Among these evidences is “the existence of tribal sheikhs as leaders of their tribes, who are supposed to represent their interests and defend their rights.” Among the similarities he mentions are the unity of the tribe’s geographical area and the existence of a common interest for its members. He concludes by mentioning that the tribe is similar to the state in that it has a warlike culture that makes it more like a military organization.

However, the phenomenon returned with force after the Houthi group took control of the capital, Sana'a, by force on September 21, 2014, and then overthrew the authority of former President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi later on. Perhaps the most important reason for its return is the collapse of state institutions and their exploitation by the parties to the conflict, especially the Houthis. Reem Mujahid says that the Houthis adopted a policy that led to "crushing the tribes and cracking their social structure due to polarization, violence, and the loss of many of their members, and they are currently in their worst condition."

This policy, according to SAM Human Rights, has included bombing homes, kidnapping sheikhs and individuals, and undermining the judiciary with a parallel entity called the “judicial guardian.” The guardian is similar to the position of the public prosecutor in that it is headed by a Houthi leader and can at any time confiscate property, including real estate, land, and commercial companies. The Houthis justify these measures by saying that they target “traitors,” a reference to their Yemeni opponents, and that they are aimed at protecting the areas under their control.

The Houthis have not only exploited the tribe as successive Yemeni authorities had done before them, but have also worked tirelessly to restructure it. This began in late October 2014 when the Houthis held a tribal conference called “The Wise Men of Yemen” attended by many tribal sheikhs. The conference was chaired by Houthi ally Sheikh Dhaif Allah Rassam, a member of the Khawlan bin Amer tribe and head of the “Popular Tribal Cohesion Council” established in the Houthi stronghold of Saada in late 2013.

In his study “The Houthis between Politics, Tribe and Sect,” researcher Ahmed Al-Tars Al-Arami considered that Sheikh Rassam’s chairing of the conference was contrary to tribal custom, and was “a kind of appointment for him as the Sheikh of the Sheikhs of Yemen, a position held or represented by the Hashid sheikhs of the Al-Ahmar family.” The goal of the conference was to use the influence of the tribe to pressure the then Yemeni president, Abd Rabbuh Hadi, to form a government.

The Houthis' mobilization guarantees the continuity of general mobilization to have fighters ready with their weapons at any time and at the lowest cost. If we compare this method to mobilization under the name of official recruitment, we will find that the latter requires financial resources in the form of monthly salaries, armament, other expenses, and ensuring post-death rights, all of which are challenging. While in the case of tribal mobilization, these volunteers only receive symbolic amounts when they remain on the front lines, and their tribes participate in financing them with money and weapons at times.

The second purpose of using the Nakf is to enable the Houthis to claim political legitimacy among Yemenis. Over the past years, the Houthis have used the Nakf to send a message that they are not just a religious or tribal minority that seized power by force, but rather a movement that enjoys social support and that without this support they would not have come to power and maintained it for all these years. This is what Houthi leader Dhaif Allah Rassam said, who told the Houthi-affiliated Al-Masirah website that if it were not for the tribes’ support with fighters, they would have lost the war in a month.

In this way, the use of the Nakf gives them the ability to frame the war as “defending the homeland” rather than defending themselves. This framing achieves two things for them: the first is an attempt to establish the idea that the war is not with local parties as a result of their coup against the government after entering Sana’a.

The second is to present themselves as a "resistance" movement against what they call "aggression" in reference to the Arab coalition. This calls for the chivalry and zeal of the tribes to stand with them in a replication of the experience of the founder of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din, when he sought the help of the tribes to confront the Ottomans in Yemen and then took over the rule after them.

The Houthis’ ability to benefit from the Nakf depends on the cooperation of tribal sheikhs and individuals, which is why they have adopted several means to ensure their cooperation. The first of these means is to weaken the authority of these sheikhs through the position of “supervisor” that they have created. According to Ahmed Al-Arami in his previous study, the Houthis choose these supervisors from the Hashemite class or from the people most loyal to them and distribute them in ministries, institutions, governorates, and tribal communities.

Unlike during the era of Ali Abdullah Saleh, where the relationship between the state and citizens passed through tribal sheikhs, in areas controlled by the Houthis it passes through the supervisor. This supervisor has multiple powers, including determining the issues for which people gather.

The second means of gaining the cooperation of tribal sheikhs and individuals is violence and coercion. Researcher Reem Mujahid’s study indicates that “the sheikhs feel that the prestige of the tribe has been crushed either by killing its leaders, demolishing their homes, looting their property, or by violating what is forbidden in customs.”

The list of killed sheikhs includes names such as Ahmed Al-Sakani, Sultan Al-Waruri, and Mujahid Qushira in Amran. Examples of sheikhs whose properties were confiscated include Abdul Wahid Al-Daam in Ibb and Mohammed Abdul Qader Al-Abdali in Al-Bayda. In addition to liquidating and looting properties, the Houthis were able to secure the support and cooperation of sheikhs by treating those who refused to cooperate as “criminals.”

Then comes the third method, which is to rehabilitate individuals who were mobilized in the name of the Nakf to fight alongside the Houthis. The Houthis hold what are called “cultural courses,” which are closed courses that last from two weeks to three months, and are held more than once. In these courses, intensive lectures are given on loyalty to the Houthi leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, “the flag-bearer,” that is, the one who combines religious and political authority based on his lineage to the Prophet’s family.

This, in the opinion of Dr. Adel Dashila, constitutes “a serious threat to the future of the tribe and its traditional cultural identity based on coexistence and respect for covenants and agreements,” as in his article “Forced Compliance: The Houthis and the Tribes of Northern Yemen.”

Through these courses and others, these people are indoctrinated with ideas and orientations that monopolize power in a certain group and sanctify its leaders. In her study, “Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen,” Nadwa Al-Dosari sees these teachings as contradictory to “the tribal social system based on the accountability of sheikhs to their communities and which is inherently hostile to ideology.”

The latest means employed by the Houthis to gain the cooperation of tribal sheikhs and individuals is to exploit regional issues and events, as is happening today in the Gaza war. The Houthis exploited the Nakf to recruit tribesmen in the name of supporting Gaza under the slogan of “the promised victory and holy jihad.”

Sheikh Faisal Amin Abu Ras said about this employment in an interview with Al-Furat that it would be legitimate if it came from the “legitimate” state, but he believes that “the last appearance of this state, even at its minimum level, was in 2011,” referring to the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, which was overthrown by the February 11 revolution.

Therefore, he believes that "any call for a truce today in light of the conflict and against its appearance is considered an evasion by the de facto authorities of internal obligations and closer to fulfilling the obligations of entrenching themselves in the conflict of the axes in the region."

The declaration of Nakf is not limited to the Houthis, but their opponents also resort to it, as is the case of the Ma'rib tribes who declared Nakf against the Houthis on September 18, 2014 in the areas of "Nakhla and Al-Suhail". Nakf has another name for these tribes, which is Al-Matareh. At that time, I decided to visit Al-Matareh out of journalistic curiosity, and it took me about two and a half hours to reach it from Sana'a, where I was staying.

When I arrived at the place, it looked like an army camp. I found thousands of militants spread over an area of fifteen kilometers, divided militarily into a front and a rear. In each section, the militants were divided into groups, each containing between twenty and twenty-five fighters, each with a commander.

Each group's tribe is responsible for covering their needs of ammunition, food, water, tents and vehicles. Some of these groups perform specific tasks such as training unskilled fighters in combat skills, reconnaissance and monitoring of Houthi movements around the clock, and support with services and supplies.

The fighters are spread out across the area, using machine guns of various calibers, the most important of which is the 23mm anti-aircraft gun mounted on Toyota Land Cruiser convertibles known in Yemen as “Chass”. They also use anti-tank guns and RPGs, in addition to locally modified armored vehicles such as “Vitara” type cars. They are stationed twenty-five kilometers from the nearest Houthi location north of the governorate.

The choice of this place was not a coincidence, but rather according to the customary rules in effect in the event of war. These include that it be close to the direction from which the invading force is expected to enter, and that it be a large, flat land after obtaining the approval of its owner.

What surprised me while I was there was the role of tribal customs in decision-making and managing disputes. For example, tribal sheikhs resort to oral voting to choose the leader and officials of other committees such as media and food supplies. The tribes signed a “reconciliation” agreement that temporarily postpones blood feuds and retaliation in order to unite against the Houthis, and the governor was authorized to resolve any emerging disputes because he is a tribal sheikh.

The success of the Nakf when used by one tribe against another is not related to the strength of the former, but rather to respecting and adhering to customs because they are the constitution of the tribes, and according to them they cannot, for example, use it against each other to strengthen influence under any pretext, even if it is in a state of active Nakf, because this contradicts its essence in “preserving sound influence and not aggressive influence,” which is what the Maragha reference explains. The more committed the tribe is to Nakf, the more its poets boast about it, as stated in the poem of the poet Sultan Abdullah Harhara, in which he describes the inhabitants of his “veiled” village as the people of Nakf:

Oh, you who are determined to set out secretly while people are sleeping, from the lofty path above Hamadan

High, veiled woman, high, you are forbidden *** The lawful things of the people of Nakaf, old and young

The tribes’ resort to unprecedented hostility reflects the seriousness of the situation they are experiencing, which targets their cohesion, interests and customs. It also gives an image of their social and political influence under the control of this or that party, and clearly indicates a significant decline and retreat in the Houthi areas.

The use of the Nakfa by the parties to the conflict to achieve political and military gains indicates that polarization and exploitation did not only target the human tribal power but also the customary one. This, along with other factors, led to the reshaping of the tribal influence map in the north by weakening certain forces and strengthening others for current and future calculations.

Source: Al Furat Magazine