What is behind the Muscat negotiations regarding prisoners and abductees between the government and the Houthis?

Surprisingly, the Omani authorities in Muscat are hosting public negotiations for the first time since the outbreak of war between the government and the Houthi militia, to discuss the issue of exchanging abductees and prisoners, which has been frozen since the last deal in April 2023.

According to government statements, the Muscat negotiations are discussing the issue of prisoners and abductees, while the Saudi Okaz newspaper also talks about the economic file, in conjunction with government economic decisions taken by the Central Bank, and the clear Houthi threat that these decisions are tantamount to a declaration of war from Saudi Arabia.

What's new in the Muscat negotiations

Informed sources told Yemen Shabab.net that two Omani delegations visited Aden and Riyadh in the past few days, and it is believed that they succeeded in holding the first meeting between the two parties in approximately six months.

The Sultanate of Oman, which is a major ally of Iran and has hosted the leaders of the Houthi militia since the beginning of the Arab coalition, has been working in undeclared mediations over the past years, and its interests have focused on the negotiations of regional and international parties more than the local side.

The unannounced negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis during the past years are among the most important mediations carried out by the Sultanate of Oman in the Yemeni crisis file, in addition to its interest in bringing views closer to Iran and the countries of the region, most notably Saudi Arabia.

According to the Saudi newspaper "Okaz", the Muscat negotiations are the result of Saudi-Omani efforts that were preceded by the success of those efforts by opening the Al-Hawban-Taiz roads for travelers without commercial trucks, and the Al-Bayda-Ma'rib road during the past weeks, but the negotiations in Muscat were sponsored by the United Nations. The office of the UN envoy has not yet announced an invitation to those negotiations.

Muscat's hosting of the negotiations also indicates that the Houthis were the ones who requested negotiations through Muscat, before the expiration of the deadline for withdrawing the currency announced by the Central Bank in early June, which ends in the coming weeks, and to avoid an economic crisis that the Houthis could not overcome compared to the past when it relied on major and regional powers to force the government. to reverse its similar decisions.

The circumstances surrounding the

The road map announced by UN envoy Hans Grundberg was frozen in December 2023, and was the result of negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis with American support. The role of the UN envoy was limited to announcing the contents of the map, which halted the outcome of developments in the region following the outbreak of the Israeli aggression on Gaza.

The US ambassador to Yemen said at the end of last May, "The Yemeni government will not sign a peace agreement in which the Houthis will have the upper hand, through their continued access to weapons, ballistic missiles and drones."

He pointed out that the peace map that Saudi Arabia presented to the United Nations - and which was supported by Washington - is not an agreement to reach a solution, and regarding its importance, he said, “This map will not be applicable in the near term, given the intentions and motives of the Houthis, and the complexities of the conflict, so we must not rush, and also that "We don't build unrealistic odds."

Houthi attacks on ships have escalated, and the Houthis have already sunk two ships so far, and reports indicate that two other ships are also threatened to sink. The Houthis also developed joint attacks with Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran, adding a new dimension to the conflict. Reports revealed relations between the Houthis and the Somali Al-Shabaab movement, which is classified as a terrorist group, and an arms smuggling movement between them.

Local reality

Locally, the Houthi naval attacks, with claims of supporting Gaza, failed to curb the rising popular anger against the Houthis since the truce, demanding salaries and improved services, refusing to compromise the republican system, and strongly dissatisfied with the intensity of Houthi collections and taxes without services.

In addition to the continued cutting of salaries and roads, and other aspects of the economic collapse in light of the Houthi failure in managing local affairs, with the emergence of the phenomenon of individual resistance operations against the Houthis with weapons in several governorates, in addition to anti-Houthi demonstrations and general strikes.

While the Houthi leaders were saying at the beginning of last March that the demand to open the roads came at the American command to open an internal front against them, as in the statements of Hussein Al-Ezzi, Muhammad Al-Bukhaiti, and Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi, they were forced by local pressure launched by thousands of Yemenis on social media.

It was embodied in the form of social initiatives to open roads, such as the White Flags Initiative, and Dr. Hammoud Al-Aoudi’s initiative to retract that discourse. In fact, they agreed to open a secondary road linking Al-Bayda and Ma’rib, and partially open a main road between Al-Hawban and the city of Taiz at the Qasr tour, for travelers only, without commercial trucks.

At the official level, the government took a series of decisions through the Central Bank, which included forcing banks to move their headquarters to Aden, and punishing banks that failed to comply with the decision. It also included a government trend that apparently aims to abolish the old currency, and also cancel all money transfer networks and limit them only to Unified network, and transferring a series of revenue institutions to Aden.

Where can the Muscat negotiations lead?

With regard to the exchange of prisoners and abductees, the two parties have achieved more than one exchange, whether through international mediation or local mediation, and the government insists in its recent negotiations that party leader Muhammad Qahtan be one of the outcomes of the upcoming negotiations.

The Houthis have refused to reveal any information about him since they kidnapped him from his home in Sanaa in April 2015. The file may witness progress, with or without Qahtan, based on past experiences.

During the negotiations of recent years, the Houthis insisted that addressing the economic file was part of the humanitarian file, but recent government decisions led to limiting the humanitarian file to the exchange of prisoners and abductees, and separating the economy from it.

This means an improvement in the government’s position before the Houthis, to begin a negotiating process that may also lead to overcoming the Houthi demands that require 80% of oil and gas revenues in exchange for the Houthis allowing re-exports according to the 2014 state budget, at least so far.