The Houthis' own weaknesses that make them as infiltrated as Hezbollah and their supporter Iran

In mid-September, the Israeli occupation managed to blow up thousands of pagers belonging to Hezbollah members in Syria and Lebanon, along with others of Iranian nationality. Throughout the second half of the same month and early October, the occupation managed to assassinate most of Hezbollah’s military and political leadership, including the party’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and his expected successor, Hashem Safieddine (October 2).

In contrast, the Israeli occupation was unable to penetrate the Hamas leadership, despite its massive destruction of the Gaza Strip and its absolute control over the Strip for a whole year, and the unlimited intelligence and military support from the United States and Western countries. The occupation itself admitted that the martyrdom of "Yahya Sinwar" in Rafah (about a week ago) was merely a coincidence after clashes with him, and not the result of an intelligence operation, as it did not know that he was "Sinwar" until the next day.

In the series of Israeli penetrations of the Iranian axis, whether the Arab Shiite militias or the Iranian leaders, up to the assassination of Hamas leader "Ismail Haniyeh" in the heart of Tehran, on July 30 while he was a guest (hours after attending the swearing-in ceremony of the new Iranian president "Massoud Pezeshkian"), and the assassination of the military commander of the Lebanese Hezbollah "Fouad Shukr" on the same night. And what preceded it of bombing the Iranian embassy building in Damascus and killing senior leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard last April, and the assassination of the deputy head of the Hamas movement "Saleh al-Arouri" also in the southern suburb of Beirut in January, and others...; all indicate a broad penetration originating from Iran and the Arab Shiite militias affiliated with it.

What happened with Iran and Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon may give the impression that the Houthis, Iran’s arm in Yemen, are also vulnerable to infiltration and targeting. This is what the former commander of the US Central Command hinted at when he confirmed, in press statements, that the United States could stop the Houthi naval attacks if it had the political will to do so.

Reasons and factors of Hezbollah's penetration

Regarding the reasons for the penetration that Hezbollah was exposed to, the Lebanese journalist Ali Hashem, who specializes in Iranian affairs and is close to Hezbollah, argues that Iran's reluctance to respond to the Israeli escalation against it encouraged the occupation to continue the assassinations, and it became clear that Iran does not have control over the escalation and does not want escalation in the first place. When the deterrence equation collapses and the cost of assassinations increases, the operation will certainly escalate by the occupation.

The journalist, who hails from southern Lebanon, believes that when the Lebanese Hezbollah entered the battle to support Gaza, as the Iranian axis calls it, it wanted it to be like crossing through a jungle of monsters in an open vehicle and jingling bells, without enough arrows for the journey that the party had drawn up, and wanted to keep it limited and shackled by what happened in the 2006 war, and the consequences of the Al-Aqsa flood in Gaza. Just as Iran has been shackled since the assassination of the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, "Qassem Soleimani", in Iraq in early 2020, and the subsequent assassinations and American-Israeli influence over it and its nuclear program.

The Lebanese journalist sums up the situation that led to all these breaches, saying that Iran and its axis confined themselves to the axis of reaction, which is the main point through which Israel was later able to carry out its assassinations.

Aside from the direct way in which the occupation was able to penetrate Hezbollah through the party’s encroachment in Syria, and its access to the list of leaders, information, and supply chains from there, and through Russia, Syria, and the United States, and the modern technological means it possesses; these measures - according to the same journalist - came as a result of Hezbollah’s transformation from a closed party to a massive force that “expanded the party as a state, with a body that includes a mixture of civilians and military personnel, to the point where some people hope to find a job in the party to secure their future in the long term. The party now has bank cards with magnetic chips to withdraw money from the ATMs of its financial system, and discount cards in designated stores, in addition to an overwhelming presence on social media platforms, and groups within these applications, both public and private. This electronic chaos, it seems, has formed a treasure trove of information ready for Israel and other countries that classify the party as an enemy, to collect and analyze.”

At the end of his analysis, the journalist close to Hezbollah links these events and their causes to bring them together in one similar result: “All the challenges of the axis (Iran and its Arab Shiite militias) are close and successive. The results of the field battle (in southern Lebanon) will be the greatest influence on the near future formula of the axis with its various layers.”

The road to the Houthi militias

The occupation's assassinations of Hezbollah leaders who were in Yemen, most notably: Ibrahim Aqil, Hajj Surur, Basil Shukr, and other senior leaders of the "Radwan Battalion" - Hezbollah's elite battalion - indicate that the Israeli occupation was closely monitoring their movements. Reports confirm that "Hajj Surur" was killed only three days after his return from Yemen.

On October 17, the United States launched airstrikes on five underground missile and drone storage sites in Sanaa and Saada. Washington confirmed that its airstrikes destroyed the underground stockpile. Satellite images later released also indicate that it also destroyed a number of tunnels.

Technically and militarily, then, there are gaps that enable the United States to penetrate the Houthi group. But the most important thing may not lie in the technical penetration; rather, in the reasons that paved the way for this penetration. Because through technology alone, the occupation failed to anticipate the attack of October 7th launched by the Qassam Brigades. It also later failed to find Hamas leaders, or to recover its prisoners from the grip of the Palestinian resistance.

For the Houthi militia, the most important thing is the availability of penetration gaps compared to Hezbollah. This includes the group’s transformation from a closed armed movement into an authority that runs most of the northern Yemeni governorates, including the occupied Yemeni capital (Sana’a), and what this means in terms of clear exposure to any follower, especially following the group’s military decisions, its leadership hierarchy, and its various security agencies, such as: security and intelligence, national steadfastness, preventive security, police intelligence, and others, all the way to the vacuum represented by the killing of Hezbollah leaders at the level of the leadership council - as the highest decision-making body.

Unlike Hezbollah, only Abdul-Malik al-Houthi is unknown even to his followers. However, Iran’s preoccupation with managing the battle in southern Lebanon may create an opportunity for a vacuum that is difficult to fill, despite Tehran’s recent appointment of a new ambassador to Sanaa, nearly three years after the death of its former ambassador, “Hassan Irloo,” in mysterious circumstances in late 2021..!!

power greedy

While the Houthi greed for power, through the Hashemite families, provides a broad entry point to understanding the Houthi structure, whether through the official state institutions, or through private institutions based on Hezbollah’s special system, represented by supervisors. Those who have expanded greatly, and have a clear leadership pyramid, such as: the social supervisor, the cultural supervisor, the security supervisor, the economic supervisor, etc., and they have a chain that begins with the Jihad Council, and ends with the supervisors of neighborhoods, institutions, students and schools.

This expansion, with the desire to control and seize power, led to conflicts within the group, which their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi himself, had previously acknowledged in a speech in late 2022, after cracks appeared within his group following the implementation of the UN truce, which is still in place today despite some violations.

When the Houthis announced last September the formation of their new government (which is recognized only by Iran), a full year after the dismissal of their previous government, the dismissed Minister of Civil Service, Salim Al-Maghlis, appeared to tell us that Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi personally supervised the appointment of its members, who numbered about 24 ministers, from among three thousand candidates. He said that the well-known social and political forces, including their ally in the General People's Congress headed by Sadiq Amin Abu Ras, did not participate in it..!

What we want to say here, behind this, is that the long delay process, and the dense list of candidates, indicate the existence of a fierce conflict, which led to a complex and difficult internal trade-off, to choose the members through the intervention of their first reference (the leader of the group), as confirmed to us by "Al-Mughlis" above. In other words, the process of distributing power, and decision-making, has increased for Al-Houthi personally, and a few of those he relies on in his office.

The names of officials in official positions in state institutions may not provide the best way to effectively penetrate the militia. Some of the major players are likely hidden, as is always the case with militia groups. But financial control, including the tempting and significant personal interests that cannot be waived by the senior leaders, “the bigwigs,” undoubtedly provides relevant information about the real decision-makers.

Money and wealth struggles

Over the past ten years, the Houthis have created a new economic class of merchants and businessmen, who have almost completely taken over the money-generating sectors of the economy, such as: oil, communications, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, transportation, real estate, education, cement, cigarettes, and exchange companies...etc., reaching control over the management and joints of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the capital. This is a clear picture of the real source of power and the decision-making centers.

For example, according to previously published reports, the Houthi leader known as “Ali Al-Hadi,” who stormed the Chamber of Commerce in the capital Sana’a and its chairman by force, was until 2016 an ordinary person working in transportation and owning three trucks (approximately) with some of his brothers. Thanks to his use as a cover by the Houthi Zakat Authority, the Endowments Authority, the Missile Force, the Drone Force, and the Navy, he obtained contracts from the World Food Program alone worth more than $150 million in the field of transportation, in a very short period.

Also, given the series of Houthi raids on companies and institutions, and the systematic and brutal seizure of the private sector since 2018, the affected traders have become well aware of the names and details of those who have been

They protected their companies and seized their companies, money and interests, and even everyone who stands behind them or works for them. The state of discord and clashes expanded among the Houthi leaders who want their share of that money. These internal conflicts between the leaders provide rich material for information.

On this basis, most Houthi leaders, such as Abdullah al-Razami, have turned into offices for the judiciary and arbitration between commercial companies, and have fueled their differences among themselves in cases amounting to millions of dollars. The forces of the warring parties, such as Abdul Karim al-Houthi (the Minister of Interior), are deployed on a disputed property representing one of the opponents, while al-Razami deploys other forces on the opposite side. Such widespread, well-known conflicts are a good reason to access information.

Loss of alliances and mistrust

Over the past years, following the assassination of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sana'a by the Houthi militia in late 2017, what remained of his party, the General People's Congress, with its leaders, employees and supporters, has been subjected to continuous targeting at both the official and unofficial levels in most areas controlled by the militia. After transforming it from a strategic ally to a mere theoretical ally, it was completely excluded from even participating in the government recently, after weakening its social influence and marginalizing the role of its tribal sheikhs, as well as the heads of neighborhoods and districts, to the point of targeting and controlling their sources of funding and companies and preventing them from practicing trade. This opens a wide door to accessing sensitive sources of information, including details of the most important Houthi figures.

The Houthis’ failure to recruit and attract thousands of military personnel residing in areas under their control has led to a lack of mutual trust between the two parties. According to several sources who spoke to “Yemeni Youth Net” under confidentiality, such individuals have become a source of great concern and fear for the militias. The gap of mistrust has widened further, reaching those working with them in the public security, central security, and military police sectors. This was clearly evident when the Houthis deployed thousands of their special forces in Sana’a and other governorates for several days on the occasion of the escalation of the recent celebrations of the September 26 Revolution anniversary.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the reasons that led to the penetration of Hezbollah and Iran arose from the multiplicity of decision-making and the existence of parallel groups of interests in authoritarian groups, and other factors in the design of those groups to target local components.

Taking into consideration the conclusion reached by the Lebanese journalist Ali Hashem: “The results of the field battle (in southern Lebanon) will be the greatest influence on the near future formula of the axis with its various layers,” it can be said that what applies to Hezbollah (which has extensive experience, as a result of its presence next to the technologically advanced Israeli occupation, and the generous Iranian support for it), may apply completely to the Houthi militias in Yemen.