How did the September 21 anniversary turn into a fierce battle against the Houthis?

On the tenth anniversary of the fall of the capital, Sana'a, to the Houthi rebel gang, the terrorist militia, loyal to Iran, was busy carrying out terror campaigns in the capital, Sana'a, and the areas under its control, by kidnapping anyone who celebrates - or threatens to celebrate - the anniversary of the September 26 Revolution that overthrew the rule of its priestly Imamate dynasty (1962 AD).

It is noteworthy that the manifestations of celebration of the Great September Revolution (September 26) increase and expand every year in the areas controlled by the militias, taking the form of peaceful popular resistance against this racist group that rebels against legitimacy, coinciding with the anniversary of its ominous coup against the legitimate authority in the country (September 21, 2014). This makes them view such increasing popular celebratory demonstrations, despite their peacefulness, as a serious threat to the survival and stability of their fragile authorities.

While the Houthi militia claims that it has become a dominant regional power, with a geo-strategic influence on the regional level in the region - as was recently stated by the person who impersonated the Minister of Defense in its government, which is recognized by no one except Iran - we find it, instead, threatening everyone who celebrates the anniversary of "September 26", whom it described, in its last statement (yesterday), as "mercenary forces and groups", thereby accusing everyone who rejects its racist Imamate behavior of working for foreign interests, while it is, in reality, the embodiment of the peak of working for foreign interests by implementing Tehran's orders and directives..!!

Kidnapping campaigns are met with revolutionary escalation campaigns

As the tenth anniversary of the Houthi coup (September 21) approaches, citizens’ celebrations of the immortal September 26 Revolution have increased in areas controlled by the militias, especially in the governorates of Sana’a, Ibb, Hodeidah, Dhamar, and Al Bayda.

Despite the campaign of repression and intimidation carried out by the militias last year, including kidnappings, arrests and torture, on the occasion of the celebration of the September 26 anniversary, which included more than 1,500 people who were kidnapped in a few days, this did not prevent people, or restrain them, out of fear, from continuing their celebrations of the anniversary this year.

According to what "Yemeni Youth Net" has monitored in the media and on social media, the militias have kidnapped, since the beginning of September, dozens of citizens, including tribal and party leaders, journalists and activists. University and school students, and even some vendors in public markets, were not spared..!!

Observers considered this increasing pace of celebrations to represent one of the strongest manifestations of the escalating rejection of the policies and behaviors of this racist gang, which rebels against the values of the republic brought about by the September 26 Revolution, stressing at the same time that the people today, through this insistence, are drawing inspiration from the values of their great revolution to get rid of the trinity: injustice, poverty and disease, which characterized the period of the Imamate monarchy, and whose dynasty today seeks to restore them after 62 years of the revolution.

 Preliminary statistics with the most prominent kidnapped

According to the latest update that "Yemeni Youth Net" was able to monitor until yesterday evening, Friday (September 20), the Houthi militia kidnapped Sheikh Brigadier Zayed Rajih Al-Muntasir from the sons of the village of "Al-Arfaf" in the Damt District, Al-Dhale Governorate, after he wrote a post calling for celebrating the September 26 Revolution.

Among the prominent journalists, the militias in Sana’a kidnapped the well-known journalist, Mohammed Dabwan Al-Mayahy, from his home yesterday morning, Friday, and confiscated his electronic devices and some of his personal belongings, due to an article he wrote against the militias on his personal Facebook page.

Also on Friday, the militia kidnapped journalist Fares Harmal, a famous blogger on social media, who was kidnapped last year for filming demonstrations marking the September 26 anniversary. His kidnapping this time came two days after his uncle Ali Thabet Harmal was kidnapped in Sana’a, in addition to Sheikh Amin Rajih, Sana’a University professor Saeed Al-Ghalisi, Dr. Ahmed Al-Ashary, and Professor Naif Al-Najjar, who were kidnapped three days ago from Sheikh Amin Rajih’s home in Sana’a.

Earlier, a person named "Arafat Qifan" was kidnapped and arrested on charges of mocking the Prophet's birthday, which the Houthis have been celebrating for about a month. It is an occasion on which they are known for forcibly collecting large sums of money from companies, merchants and citizens.

According to special sources for "Yemeni Youth Net", the number of kidnapped people in Sana'a alone exceeded 500 people until Friday evening.

One of these sources said: The campaign is still ongoing, and is becoming more intense day by day, as the anniversary of the September 26 Revolution approaches, adding: Therefore, it is difficult to obtain accurate final numbers. However, he downplayed the effectiveness of this Houthi campaign, which he described as “desperate,” without intimidating society, but rather motivating, considering that this is “a price that must be paid to confront the Houthis and the Iranian occupation.”

Ibb Governorate.. The most prominent celebration and the most kidnapping

Ibb governorate had the lion's share of the widespread announcements to celebrate the anniversary of the September 26 Revolution, and was the most exposed to kidnapping, arrest and detention, according to the confirmation of a local source.

Despite the increased level of prevention and restrictions during the first years of the war, people resorted to exploiting gatherings, weddings and graduation parties, which gradually turned into possible alternative occasions for implicit (non-violent) protest against the coup rebels, by giving a national character to these gatherings through songs, anthems and national chants, then raising national flags and republican slogans. Later, the manifestations of peaceful protests expanded through the revival of Tarawih and Qiyam prayers during the months of Ramadan in spite of the Houthis who prevented them from these rituals, in addition to the demonstrations of the Association of Mothers of Abductees that began early in the areas controlled by the Houthis. Although all these small and simple outlets did not pass unnoticed, but rather faced a lot of repression and harassment in various ways and means, including prevention, arrest, kidnapping, intimidation and even killing sometimes.

• However, in September 2022, thousands of Yemenis suddenly found themselves venturing out to commemorate the September 26 Revolution, and this time not only through social media and remote villages, but they also took to the streets of the occupied Yemeni capital (Sana’a) that afternoon, in the Seventieth Unit, the Ring Road, and Al-Zubairi, followed by extensive, intensive celebrations in a number of governorates, most notably: Ibb, Al-Hodeidah, and Dhamar. At the time, the Houthi terrorist militia was unable to contain these demonstrations, despite their use of excessive force.

Popular funerals as a broad public referendum

The capital, Sana’a, which is under the control of the Houthi priestly militia, witnessed, during a period of about a year and a half (from mid-2021 to early 2023), the four largest popular funerals so far, for great national figures, namely: the funeral of the late scholar Muhammad Al-Amrani, the Grand Mufti of the Republic (July 2021), the funeral of the great Yemeni poet Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Maqalih (November 2022), and the funerals of Sheikhs Hussein (April 2022) and Sadiq (January 2023) - the sons of Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar.

It can be said that the large public presence witnessed by these funerals represented profound indicators of a broad peaceful popular resistance against the arrogance and tyranny of the Houthis. All of the funeral attendees were prominent and influential religious, cultural and tribal figures. Most importantly, all of them were national republican figures who adhered to the principles and values of the September 26 Revolution. Those among them who had not explicitly declared their rejection of the Houthi coup and its orientations preferred to isolate themselves without identifying with them or becoming a mouthpiece and a gear in their project. The streets of the occupied capital, Sana'a, were filled with thousands of mourners who were not afraid to chant national slogans, turning such funerals into a kind of broad popular referendum adhering to the republic and supporting the revolution. This increased the isolation of the Houthi gang from the principles and values of Yemeni society, as this dynastic group had imposed a siege on the people, and even prevented them from attending such expressive funerals in national solidarity during previous years.

"Go away, Houthi" demonstrations... and the "kohl-rimmed revolutionary" model

• In March 2023, the Houthi militia killed a young man in one of its prisons in Ibb Governorate, after arresting him. Known as "Hamdi Al-Mukhal", he was famous for his sharp criticism and continuous defiance of the Houthi militia through a number of video recordings that he used to broadcast successively on social media. As a result, his funeral turned into the strongest anti-Houthi demonstration ever in the areas under their control, to date. This demonstration, in which thousands of citizens, men, women, youth and teenagers participated, was distinguished by raising patriotic slogans glorifying the September Revolution, and boldly demanding the departure of the Houthi priestly gang, even despite the kidnapping campaigns and arrests that targeted them, in an attempt to intimidate and disperse them, to prevent any repercussions that might derail the memorial event into the unknown. Although the militias succeeded in confining the repercussions of the explosive popular anger to somewhat narrow limits, such a demonstration, from the point of view of a number of observers, constitutes a development that cannot be ignored in the path of popular rejection, which has begun to grow in this governorate in particular, through the emergence of successive individual models of the “Mukhal” character, and other collective ones through the continuation of anti-Houthi activities.

Saada elements to confront Sana'a heroes

• In September 2023: The terrorist Houthi militia deployed thousands of its radical elements, brought in from Saada Governorate, as a replacement for its police personnel residing in the capital, Sana’a, in anticipation of suppressing any escalatory movements that might result from citizens’ celebrations of the September national holidays. It had anticipated this through the demonstrators’ bold and increasing calls on Facebook pages.
• On the 25th of the month (one day before the anniversary of the immortal September Revolution), militia elements violently tore up the national flag after a small celebration in the "Rimas" roundabout. This provoked the Yemeni street and prompted it to go out the next day by the tens of thousands in the governorates of Sana'a, Ibb, and Al Hudaydah, mainly, and other governorates, chanting for the republic.
• This was the most prominent challenge facing the Houthis, up until that time, to the point that their senior leaders, including Abdul-Malik al-Houthi himself, along with the so-called “Mahdi al-Mashat” who was impersonating the president, and other militia leaders, issued statements accusing the celebrants of being a tool of American, Zionist, and British intelligence, threatening them with the use of force to maintain security..!!
• March 2024; A Houthi crime of blowing up houses over the heads of their residents in Rada’a, Al Bayda Governorate, last Ramadan, led to a large popular demonstration preceded by chants of: “There is no god but God, the Houthis are the enemy of God,” and “No Houthis from today on,” which constituted a new qualitative development in the history of popular struggle, with the strong and heavily armed areas of Rada’a entering peaceful action, despite the fact that the armed battles that the tribes there are waging against the terrorist group hardly calm down before they erupt again.

The role of unions in escalating protests

• In conjunction with the unorganized popular movement, which was limited to certain activities; such as: celebrating the anniversary of the September 26 Revolution, celebrations of the national team’s victory, and those expressive manifestations in the funerals of national figures, the killing of “Al-Makhal”, and the crime of bombing citizens’ homes in Rada’a...etc.; the unions and professional groups emerged in organizing a series of successful demonstrations and protest strikes, especially during the second half of the past war years, the most prominent and effective of which was the formation, establishment and strike of the Yemeni Teachers Club, which has been waging a strike against free education since last year until today to force the militias, which collect huge taxes, to pay teachers’ salaries, despite the kidnapping, intimidation and hostage campaigns against its leaders.
• A number of labor organizations, such as: the unions of mineral water, clothing and pharmaceutical factories, private commercial power stations, the Judges Club, the Bar Association, the General Federation of Chambers of Commerce, and others, have organized strikes and protest activities over the past two years (specifically since the April 2022 truce). Some of them have achieved wide successes, during which the militias were forced to back down from their destructive economic policies, while negotiations continue in others that the Houthis still refuse to respond to so far.
• Over the past years, dozens of tribes have also organized a series of sit-ins and protests, the most prominent of which began in Sana’a and extended to include other governorates, such as Dhamar, Al-Jawf, Sa’dah, and other governorates. Most of them are confined to tribal rights demands, but some of them almost develop into general national demands, as they are often limited as a result of the intransigence of the militias and their use of force.

Demonstrations reach Saada