Report reveals methods and ways of smuggling Iranian weapons to the Houthi militias and their path of expansion in the Horn of Africa

A report issued by the Platform for Tracking Organized Crime and Money Laundering in Yemen (PTOC) in the second part, entitled “Smuggling Weapons and Fighters,” revealed that the Houthi militia relies heavily on smuggling weapons across the Red Sea through smugglers and African mafias, under the supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

The report issued by the platform in both Arabic and English, explained that these smuggled weapons reached a number of countries overlooking the Red Sea (Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan) before being assembled and delivered to the Houthis via the port of Hodeidah. The platform reinforced its report with documents and detailed information that revealed the existence of a wide network for smuggling weapons to some African countries via Hodeidah, after they arrived there from Iran; with the aim of feeding its intelligence elements in those countries.

According to the report, this activity is carried out by a number of people within a large network led by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, within the Houthi expansion cell in the Horn of Africa led by the so-called "Abdul Wahid Abu Ras" (whom the militia appointed as Deputy Foreign Minister in its unrecognized government two weeks ago) and the militia's security and intelligence apparatus, and the so-called Houthi Jihadist Office, which diversifies the sources of weapons to the Houthis, and works to obtain weapons from India and Pakistan, and then carries out the process of smuggling them to the Houthis in Yemen.

Smuggling weapons from Iran to Yemen

The report reached a list of arms dealers who re-smuggle weapons from Sudan to Yemen, by transporting them to the Eritrean islands, and then the smugglers transport them from the Eritrean islands by sea to Hodeidah, from where they are transferred to the Houthi militia in Yemen. The report also revealed that weapons are purchased from different African regions, including Eritrea, especially used weapons that their owners obtained during the liberation wars with Ethiopia, in addition to what is sent by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to that region with the aim of re-sending them to the Houthis in Yemen.

The report indicated that the smuggling routes pass through the Eritrean coast and directly across the sea to the Houthi-controlled Hodeidah Governorate. The report obtained information indicating that Sudan has entered the arms smuggling line to Ethiopia and Eritrea and then to Yemen, where weapons are smuggled from South Sudan to border areas with northern Sudan and then smuggled to Wadi Al-Qadarif, then to Taklai on the northern Eritrean coast and then to the Yemeni coast.

The report confirmed that Iran continues to supply the Houthi militia in Yemen with various types of weapons, especially since the outbreak of the war in late March 2015, to prolong the war and destabilize security and stability in Yemen and the region. It pointed out that the pace of smuggling weapons to the Houthis via the sea has increased against the backdrop of the war waged by Israel against the Gaza Strip since October 7, as Iran has supplied the Houthis with ballistic missiles and drones to target international navigation in the Red Sea since November 19.

Ports used to smuggle weapons to the Houthis

Djibouti and playing on the open

The report revealed the role played by Djibouti, which it described as "malicious", confirming its connection to actors such as Iran and the Houthis, and accusing it of involvement in various activities in the black market, including money laundering, illicit financing, oil smuggling, and arms trafficking. It has also become a transit point for arms smuggling for Iran and its agents in Yemen and the region.

He pointed out that the material assistance provided by entities in Djibouti to the Houthis undermines what he described as Djibouti's "alleged neutrality" and its apparent efforts to promote peace in Yemen, reviewing a number of arms shipments that were seized during the past period, and its position of refusing to condemn the attacks launched by the Houthi militia on maritime traffic in the Red Sea.

The report reviewed the points of unloading weapons to the Houthis, the first of which is an area located in the "Oman Sea" near the Omani island of "Al-Halaniyat", 20 nautical miles from the island towards the southwest of the island, in addition to a point located off the Somali coast in the Zeila area, which differs from one time to the other, in addition to the port of "Berbera" in Somalia, where supplies and other materials transported from Iran are unloaded at the port before being transported in boxes to Hodeidah and delivered to the Houthi militias, as well as an area located offshore west of Ras Issa, 5 miles from the island of "Al-Asha".

Weapons landing areas on the Yemeni coast

The report revealed the areas of unloading weapons on the Yemeni coasts. The first point is located on the coasts of Al Mahrah Governorate, which is “Khor Khalfon”, which is located north of “Nishtun” port. Another point is located on the coasts of Al Mahrah Governorate, which is (Yarb or Harut), which is located in the middle between Al Ghaydah and Nishtun. Another is in Ras Issa. In the unloading location, there is no iron dock where weapons are unloaded. The supervisor of the area is the so-called Al Mutawakil, where all smuggled materials for the Houthi militias, including weapons, are unloaded at this dock.

While the report indicated that Hadhramaut Governorate is one of the main smuggling routes for Iranian weapons, whether coming through land ports from Oman or coming by sea from the coasts of Oman and neighboring Al Mahrah or coming by sea from the coasts of Somalia and Djibouti, the report confirmed the decline in smuggling operations across the coasts of Shabwa after its liberation from the Houthis.

The report quoted private sources as saying that the Iranians are the ones who smuggle the arms shipments in the first sea phase, while the Houthi leaders from Saada Governorate are in charge of receiving them in the final phase near the Yemeni coast, and they are the ones who also supervise their smuggling by land within the Yemeni governorates.

Elements of arms smuggling to the Houthi militia

The report revealed the most prominent Iranian leaders who are in charge of smuggling Iranian weapons to the Houthi militia, most notably "Abdul Reza Shahlaei", who the report said is considered a financier and a major leader in Yemen, and one of the Iranian leaders responsible for arms smuggling operations to Yemen, noting that he was the target of an unsuccessful American strike. "Shahlaei" is one of the most prominent Iranian military leaders present in Yemen, and one of the prominent leaders of the Iranian Quds Force.

The report mentioned a list of Yemeni figures who are in charge of receiving Iranian weapons smuggled to the Houthi militia, most notably "Ibrahim Hassan Halwan", nicknamed "Abu Khalil", from Saada Governorate, in addition to "Ahmed Mohammed Halas" from Al Hudaydah Governorate, in addition to Faiz Masas, Abdul Malik Shaabi Mashouli, and Mohammed Abdo Mashouli, who work as sailors, in addition to Abdul Aziz Mohammed Qaid, Qaid Mohammed Qaid, and Ali Mohammed Al Halahli, the latter of whom resides in the capital, Habra neighborhood, in addition to 15 others who work as sailors to receive shipments of weapons arriving from Iran and smuggle them to the Houthis in Sana'a.

The risks of continued arms smuggling to and from the Houthis

The report revealed the risks of continued arms smuggling to and from the Houthis, most notably prolonging the war in Yemen, destabilizing the security and stability of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea by igniting military conflicts and unrest in their countries, and increasing piracy operations in the Red and Arabian Seas and Bab al-Mandab.

In addition to disrupting the political process in Yemen, harming regional and international efforts aimed at ending the war, achieving a comprehensive political settlement, enhancing the Houthis’ military capabilities and strengthening their authority politically, militarily, security-wise and economically, especially in Sana’a and the northern governorates, and the resulting deepening of the conflict and existing division and a threat to national unity.

Moreover, the risks also include threatening national and regional security in the region through alliances with extremist organizations and groups, especially Al-Qaeda, and providing them with weapons and trained elements to carry out terrorist operations in Yemen and the region, and seeking to target neighboring countries and the region, or launching attacks targeting economic capabilities and interests in the Red Sea and the region.

The dangers of arms smuggling to the Houthis are also highlighted by targeting commercial ships in the Red Sea and disrupting international navigation and shipping in the strategic waterway by launching military operations using Iranian weapons, which causes great harm to the global economy and the Suez Canal.

Strengthening the capabilities of the Yemeni Navy

The report recommended supporting and strengthening the Yemeni Navy, Joint Forces and the Yemeni Coast Guard and providing them with the necessary military, logistical and intelligence capabilities to combat arms smuggling and human trafficking across the entire Yemeni coast, and increasing naval patrols in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to prevent arms smuggling and human trafficking.

The report also recommended cooperation with international naval forces to enhance capabilities in detecting and preventing illegal activities in Yemeni territorial waters and international waters in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, in addition to enhancing intelligence and security cooperation with the countries of the Horn of Africa and the countries bordering the Red Sea.

The report also recommended forming a joint working group to monitor combating arms smuggling and human trafficking, and imposing international sanctions on individuals and entities linked to arms smuggling and human trafficking for the benefit of the Houthi militia, with updating the sanctions lists based on new information to prevent financing and logistical support for these activities.